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During the past decade a great deal of attention has been paid to the
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Williams and Michael P. Williamson, students at Vanderbilt Law School, for their research assist-
ance.
1. The Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program (OASDI), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-432 (1976), provides for the payment of disability benefits to insured wage earners. Id.
§ 423. The program also provides for the payment of secondary benefits to certain disabled de-
pendents of wage earners. See, e.g., id. § 402(e)(1)(B) (disabled widow); id. § 402(f)(1)(B) (dis-
abled widower). In addition, since 1974 uninsured disabled persons and disabled insured wage
earners with low monthly benefits may be eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) bene-
fits, depending on need. Id. §§ 1381-1383(c).
The disability requirements for insured wage earners through the OASDI program and for all
persons through the SSI program are identical. See text accompanying notes 22-41 infra. The
disability requirement for secondary benefits is somewhat more strict. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(B) (1976). No distinctions need be drawn among these various types of disability ben-
efits for the purposes of this Article. Unless indicated otherwise, the term "disability benefits" is
applied to all OASDI and SSI disability benefits. OASDI and SSI benefits are also paid on the
basis of old age, id. §§ 402(a), 1382(a)(1), and blindness, id. §§ 423(d)(1)(B), 1382(a)(1). Disabil-
ity determinations are far more complex, however, and therefore have been the subject of most
concern about the determination process. Although this Article deals only with Social Security
disability determinations, similar concerns exist relative to other Social Security eligibility issues,
and non-adversary eligibility determinations in other similar social programs. See, e.g., Popkin,
The Effect of Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study of Three Disability Programs,
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houses of Congress and the Social Security Administration have con-
sidered numerous proposals to improve the disability determination
process. 2 Many of the proposals were based on studies or critiques of
the non-adversary system for determining eligibility that has been used
since disability benefits were added to the Social Security program in
1956.3 The entire disability determination process is non-adversary be-
cause Social Security Administration personnel are expected to assist
claimants who generally are unrepresented;4 most debate concerning
the future of the non-adversary process and the value of representation
in the process, however, has focused on the administrative hearing
stage.5
Two sets of statistics have raised doubts concerning the efficiency
62 CORNELL L. REv. 989, 993-1004 (1977) (study includes Federal Employees' Compensation Act
and Veterans Disability Program, as well as Social Security).
2. The most recent congressional inquiry into the disability determination process resulted
in the enactment of a number of reforms included in the Social Security Disability Amendments
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, §§ 304-312, 94 Stat. 441, 453-460 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980
Amendments]. See note 44 infra and text accompanying notes 103-08 infra. The Social Security
Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW)) recently proposed and then withdrew an experiment to provide representa-
tives for the government at Social Security hearings when claimants were represented by counsel.
45 Fed. Reg. 2345, 47162 (1980). See text accompanying notes 196-204 infra. For earlier indica-
tions of congressional concern, see, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., IST SEss., RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DIs-
ABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS CRISIS (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as RECENT STUD-
IES]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH
CONG., 2D Sass., DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited
as DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE]; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG.,
IST SESS., ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL SECURITY ACT DISABILITY PROGRAMS 22-56 (Comm.
Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as ISSUES RELATED TO DISABILITY PROGRAMS].
3. Recent studies that cover many areas considered during the deliberations over the 1980
Amendments, supra note 2, include: STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER]; J.
MASHAw, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1978) (National Center for Administrative Justice study authorized
and funded by the Social Security Administration) [hereinafter cited as J. MASHAW, et al.]. Other
related studies include: R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE-A PROB-
LEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION (1973); Popkin, supra note 1.
Congressional concern about the disability determination process continues. The Conference
Report on the 1980 Amendments calls for a review of the entire process by the National Commis-
sion on Social Security. H.R. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
1980 Conference Report].
4. See generally text accompanying notes 47-69 infra. See also Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 403 (1971).
5. See studies cited in notes 2 and 3 supra. See also Champagne & Danube, An Empirical
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/1
Number 21 NON-ADVERSARY HEARINGS
and accuracy of the disability determination process: the high rate of
reversals after hearings by administrative law judges, which tends to
show that claims are not developed properly by Administration person-
nel at the initial stages of the process,6 and the large number of cases
remanded for further consideration by the federal courts, which tends
to show that claims are not adjudicated properly by administrative law
judges.7
Some reversals by administrative law judges are necessary because of
the presentation of evidence of a new condition that did not exist at the
time of the earlier decision.' Most of these reversals and remands are
Analysis of Decisions of Administrative Law Judges in the Social Security Disability Program, 64
GEO. LJ. 43 (1975).
6. During the 1979 fiscal year 57% of all OASDI disability decisions and 53% of all concur-
rent OASDI and SSI disability decisions brought to hearing were reversed by administrative law
judges. OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEW, OHA FACT SHEET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979 at 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1979 FACT
SHEET]. Although the reversal rate is only approximately 33% in non-disability determinations,
id., at least 75% of all hearing requests received in the 1979 fiscal year involved disability determi-
nations. [1979] SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. ANN. REP. 59 (percentage approximate because SSI
requests not separated by basis of eligibility). See also note 86 infra. Since these figures relate
only to those decisions brought to hearing, the reversal rate is slight relative to the total number of
claims denied. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 n.29 (1976).
A related concern is the extreme variation in the reversal rates of individual administrative law
judges and in the general quality of their decisions. See generally R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 76;
Champagne & Danube, supra note 5 (study shows no significant correlation between judge's back-
ground and attitudes, and reversal rate); Chassman & Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings:
.4 Case Study in Quality .4ssurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (1980) (analysis of
recently implemented quality assurance system designed to identify and correct serious errors in
determining disability by administrative law judges, evaluated on the record developed at the
hearing). See also note 78 infra.
Presently, all OASDI and SSI hearings are held by federal administrative law judges (ALJs)
assigned to the Social Security Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals. These cases were
heard by Hearing Examiners, and the change was made not without controversy. See generaly
Crampton, Title Changefor Federal Hearing Examiners? "4 Rose by Any Other Name .... "40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 918 (1972); Rosenblum, The Administrative Law Judge in the Administrative
Process: Interrelations of Case Law with Statutory Factors in Determining AL_. Roles, reprinted in
RECENT STUDIEs, supra note 2, 171 at 205-30; Comment, Social Security Hearings for the Dis-
abled-Who Decides" Trial Examiners or Administrative Law Judges?, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 915
(1975). The title administrative law judge is used in this Article unless it appears otherwise in
quotation.
7. In the 1979 fiscal year more than 40% of all OASDI and SSI cases filed in the federal
district courts resulted in a remand for further administrative proceedings and less than 10% were
reversed outright. 1979 FACT SHEET, supra note 6, at 4.
8. Evidence of a new disabling condition and new evidence of a preexisting condition can
be presented for the first time at the hearing. See generally text accompanying notes 41-64 infra.
See also note 10 infra.
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necessary, however, because records are not developed properly during
the initial stages of the process and are not completed at the adminis-
trative hearing.9 The fact that claimants have no opportunity to meet
face-to-face with a decisionmaker and receive little or no assistance in
developing their evidence of disability prior to hearing may also con-
tribute to the high reversal rate of administrative law judges. Never-
theless, the high reversal rate is strong evidence of serious deficiencies
in the prehearing stages of the process.' 0 Similarly, federal judges who
hear relatively few disability cases and who have no opportunity to
compare the records before them to others that had been approved ear-
lier in the process may be disinclined to foreclose eligibility for claim-
ants on appeal." The high remand rate by federal courts and the
courts' reasoning for these remands, however, show that administrative
law judges are unable to remedy the deficiencies of the prehearing pro-
cess at the hearing.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the non-adversary structure
of the disability determination process, identify its major limitations,
and explore the role, if any, for representation and advocacy in this
setting, particularly at the administrative hearing stage. Under the cur-
9. A 1977 study found that disability determinations were being made without evidence
being properly developed both before and at the administrative hearing level. CENTER FOR AD-
MINISTRATIVE JUSTICE, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1977), re-
printedin DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE, supra note 2, at 48 [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
SECURITY HEARING SYSTEM] (summary and conclusions of report later published by Professor
Mashaw and others, see J. MASHAw, el al., supra note 3). In recent testimony, the Commissioner
of Social Security blamed the high reversal rate by administrative law judges on the poor develop-
ment of records before the hearing. Disability Insurance Legislation: Hearings on Proposals to
Improve the Disability Insurance Program before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House
Comm on Ways andMeans, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 250-51 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House
Hearings]. See also Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1972) (large number of
remands are the result of courts' proper oversight coupled with "placid procrastination-'passing
the buck,' if you will--on the part of hearing examiners"); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMMITrEE STAFF REPORT ON THE DISABILITY INSURANCE
PROGRAM 272-78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT] (most remands by district courts,
whether requested by the Social Security Administration or by claimant, were ordered because of
deficiencies in the factual record).
10. The disability determination process is described at text accompanying notes 42-69 infra.
Records can be incomplete because evidence, even of a preexisting disability, was not available.
Under these circumstances, a reversal by an administrative law judge can "represent a perfection
of the administrative process rather than adjudication." Dixon, The Weffare State and Mass Jus-
tice: .4 arningfrom the Social Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681, 695 n.71.
11. See generally Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARv. L. REV. 833, 845-47
(1976). See also Dixon, supra note 10, at 732-33 n.258; note 111 infra.
[Vol. 59:349
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rent non-adversary structure something like advocacy is needed at disa-
bility hearings, but the responsibility for advocating both the claimant's
and the Social Security Administration's position is left to the adminis-
trative law judge. 12 Recent studies indicating that claimants fare better
at hearings with representation, 13 the fact that the Administration is
concerned about the need for government representation, and the ap-
parent reality that many administrative law judges are not fulfilling
their advocacy role adequately, suggest that a new model for meeting
the representation and advocacy needs of non-adversary disability
hearings would be useful.
One alternative, of course, would be adversary hearings. Although
the possible value of a shift to something like adversary hearings has
been recognized recently by the Social Security Administration,' 4 most
commentators have concluded that the non-adversary system, with per-
haps some modification, should remain.' 5 Rejection of an adversary
12. The notion that Social Security administrative law judges must wear "three hats" has
been recognized widely. See, e.g., B. SCHwARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 253 (1976). See gener-
ally text accompanying notes 73-82 infra. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971)
(Court rejected arguments based on an "advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion," finding that
"[t]he social security hearing examiner ...does not act as counsel. He acts as an examiner
charged with developing the facts.").
13. The most comprehensive study is by Popkin, supra note 1. See also Boyd & Johnson,
Report ofthe Disability Claims Process Task Force, reprintedin RECENT STUDIEs, supra note 2, 1
at 101-02; Dixon, supra note 10, at 720-22. An absence of clear data on the effect of representation
was noted in an article published three years before the Popkin study, in which the author also
expressed his doubts as to whether one could show a cause-and-effect relationship between repre-
sentation and favorable decisions, given such additional factors as the relative quality of cases
lawyers choose to take, and of cases claimants choose to bring to lawyers. Mashaw, The Manage-
ment Side ofDue Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance ofAccuracy,
Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication oSocial Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772,
790, 790 n.52 (1974). The findings of the Popkin study and other related material on the effect of
representation are discussed at text accompanying notes 86-89, 95-98 infra.
14. The proposed experiment with government representatives would have added an adver-
sary dimension to the process, although the degree of adversariness of the hearing was not clear.
See text accompanying notes 199-204 infra.
15. See, ag., J. MAsHAw, et al., supra note 3, at 32-33; B. SCHwARTZ, supra note 12, at 252-
54; Mashaw, supra note 13, at 776-804. At the time that legal services programs were first being
funded by the federal government a number of commentators called for strong advocacy by law-
yers and full adjudicatory procedures regarding welfare benefits particularly. See, eg., Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1253 (1965);
Sparer, The Role ofthe Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 361, 366-74 (1965). C
Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 492-500
(1966) (limited use of any type of adjudicatory procedures in dealing with problems of general
welfare administration). It has been suggested that a distinction can be drawn between the admin-
istration of state-run welfare programs, which is often hostile to claimants, and that of the Social
Number 2]
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system for disability hearings, however, should not preclude a rejection
of the artificial and unworkable advocacy roles assigned to administra-
tive law judges. The question of whether to provide a representative or
advocate for claimants, the Social Security Administration, or both,
should not be approached from the perspective of the parties' separate
interests, as an issue of a right to or need for counsel. 16 The question
should be framed from an institutional and structural perspective: As-
suming a shared interest on the part of claimants and the government
in a fairly and properly administered Social Security program, which
forms the underlying premise for the use of a non-adversary process in
the first place, how can these shared goals be achieved more equitably
and efficaciously? The following analysis of the present disability de-
termination process, including the roles assigned to administrative law
judges and representatives at hearings, the courts' concern for the rights
of claimants who were unrepresented in the process, and recent sugges-
tions for change in the process including the proposed government rep-
resentative experiment, demonstrates that there is a need for
independent advocacy and representation at non-adversary disability
hearings.
The use of independent non-adversary representatives responsible
for development and presentation of all relevant evidence and issues
would resolve most of the deficiencies in the hearing stage of the pres-
ent process, including those resulting from deficiencies in the prehear-
ing stages. Administrative law judges would be relieved of
unmanageable responsibilities and the hearing would be conducted
fairly and on a complete record without undermining the advantages of
a non-adversary system or incurring the cost of instituting truly adver-
sary proceedings.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to project costs to the
Security Administration, which is seen as more helpful to claimants. See Popkin, supra note 1, at
992 n.4, and authorities cited therein. But see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1267, 1289 (1975), in which Judge Friendly suggested that the adversary system also may be
unsuitable in welfare cases.
16. See generaly Mashaw, supra note 13, at 775. There is no suggestion here that claimants
have a legal or constitutional right to be provided counsel. Although claimants can, of course,
bring lawyers or other representatives to disability hearings, 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), Mathews v. El-
drige, 424 U.S. 319,339 (1976), the argument that a lack of representation violates due process was
dismissed recently as "frivolous." Figueroa v. Secretary of HEW, 585 F.2d 551, 554 (Ist Cir.
1978). The federal government planned to provide lawyers for welfare claimants in 1969, 34 Fed.
Reg. 1356 (1969), but the proposal was withdrawn following a change in administrations. 35 Fed.
Reg. 10591 (1970).
[Vol. 59:349
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system of introducing some type of representation into the process, it
can be assumed that the lack of representation or proper development
and presentation by the administrative law judges results in many
costly remands that would be unnecessary if more cases were devel-
oped and presented properly before or at the original hearing. More-
over, it would be inappropriate to suggest that increased cost resulting
from additional correct determinations of disability would be a loss to
the system, and an improved process would probably produce signifi-
cant cost savings because there would be fewer incorrectly determined
awards of benefits. 17 A single non-adversary representative with only
those resources currently available to administrative law judges would
provide the basic, routine evidence often absent from records under the
existing system. In addition, the representative would be trained and
available to explore evidence and issues suggested by the record that
might otherwise be ignored. As a result, a non-adversary structure
clearly appropriate for disability adjudications, and one that probably
should be considered for many other types of adjudications,"8 would
achieve the advantages of a more traditional judicial role for the deci-
sionmaker without adding unnecessary formalities and opposition to
the proceedings or altering their fundamental non-adversary character.
I. THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION AT NON-ADVERSARY
HEARINGS
Despite its non-adversary character, the disability determination
process is designed to test whether a claimant, who may or may not be
eligible, should receive monthly disability benefits. By the time claim-
ants file for a hearing, the government has already disagreed with the
claimants' evaluation of their disability and ruled against them. The
participants view the hearing as anything but a neutral process. 19 In
this section, the entire disability determination process is reviewed;
17. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
96TH CONG., IST SEss., ACTUARIAL CONDITION OF DISABILITY INSURANCE 13 (Comm. Print
1979) ("The important point is that better documentation has led to more 'right' decisions."). See
also note 173 infra.
18. See generally Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Faciflding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1083 (1975); Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). See
also Friendly, supra note 15, at 1289.
19. See Yourman, Report on a Study of Social Security Benefciary Hearings, Appeals, and
Judicial Review, reprinted in RECENT STUDIES, supra note 2, 125 at 139. See also B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 12, at 253.
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then, the hearing procedures are analyzed in some detail to determine
whether there is a need for representation at non-adversary hearings.
A. The Social Security Disability Determination Process
The procedural rules and substantive law governing the Social Se-
curity disability programs are extremely complex.2" A brief survey of
the scope and purposes of the programs, substantive disability law, and
the disability determination process follows in order to frame the issues
concerning the hearing properly.
1. The Social Security Disabili&y Programs
Congress added disability benefits for insured wage earners to the
Social Security program in 1956, which was twenty-one years after the
Social Security Act first established a retirement insurance program. 2'
To establish disability, one must be unable "to engage in any substan-
tial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months. 22 Furthermore, the impairment must be "de-
monstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques," although disability has been established by subjective evi-
dence of pain reasonably related to a determinable medical condition.23
The requirement of a medical impairment which is severe enough to
preclude substantial gainful activity, shows that disability benefits are
designed to alleviate only total disruptions of earnings caused by a
physical or mental inability to moderate the loss by any type of activ-
ity.24 Moreover, the disruption must be based on a disability that be-
gan within a period of time related to the claimant's receipt of earned
20. See generally H. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES (1978 &
Supp. 1980). There are separate federal regulations for OASDI and SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1-
.1930 (OASDI) (1980); id. §§416.101-.2119 (SSI). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 52078, 55566 (1980)
(reorganization and revision of portions of these regulations). Unless there is a significant differ-
ence, only the OASDI regulations are cited.
21. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. Disability benefits were first limited to persons
fifty years of age and over. Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, 70 Stat. 807. The
minimum age requirement was dropped in 1960. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-778, § 401, 74 Stat. 967.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1976).
23. Id. § 423(d)(3); 45 Fed. Reg. 55589 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). See
generally H. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 412.
24. See generally Liebman, supra note 1 I, at 842-50. The loss here is limited to earned in-
[Vol. 59:349
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income because a special insured status required for the disability pro-
gram remains in effect only for a limited time following a claimant's
last covered employment.25
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kerner v. Fleming26 in effect
modified this concept of total disability from both a medical and a vo-
cational point of view by holding that the medical impairment need
preclude only employment reasonably available in the area where the
claimant lived.27 Thus, although a claimant's impairment would be
measured relative to any substantial gainful employment reasonably
available in the area, benefits could not be denied because of the claim-
ant's medical capacity to perform a job available only in a distant part
of the country. Congress reacted in 1967 by amending the Act to state
explicitly that insured wage earners are disabled only if their impair-
ments are so severe that they cannot do their previous work or, "con-
sidering [their] age, education, and work experience, [cannot] engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area
in which [the claimant] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists
* . , or whether [the claimant] would be hired," and that it is sufficient
if suitable work exists "in several regions of the country. '28
Despite the limited scope of coverage resulting from the 1967
amendments, which were designed to limit rising costs of the pro-
gram,29 wage earner disability awards have increased steadily since
1968-an increase from approximately 325,000 in 1968 to over 450,000
in 1978.30 Moreover, disability benefits became available to uninsured
disabled persons in 1974 through the Supplemental Security Income
come because there are no limits on unearned income or resources in the OASDI program. See
note 1 supra.
25. Insured wage earners can retain insured status for up to five years following their last
covered employment, depending on their work record before that time. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)
(1976). To qualify for OASDI, the disability must have commenced before the expiration of the
claimant's insured status, although the application can be filed at any time. Retroactive benefits
are limited, however, to one year prior to the date of the application. Id. § 423(b).
26. 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
27. See generally Liebman, supra note 11, at 850-53.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976). See Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-248, § 158(d)(2)(A), 81 Stat. 868. Persons seeking disability benefits as dependents, so-called
"secondary benefits," must show that they are precluded from "engaging in any gainful activity,"
regardless of their age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1976).
29. See H.R. RaP. No. 544, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1967).
30. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH
CONG., lST Sass., ACTUARIAL CONDITION OF DISABILITY INSURANCE 5 (Comm. Print 1979).
Number 21
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program, which has essentially the same disability standard, without
limitations imposed by special insured status, but with an added re-
quirement that financial need be shown.3 ' Almost seven million Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income disability beneficiaries re-
ceived approximately sixteen billion dollars in 1979.32
2. Proving Disability
Disability can be established either with or without relation to "voca-
tional factors" of age, education, and work experience. 33 Medical evi-
dence alone can be sufficient to prove disability if the impairment is
severe enough to meet the standards set forth in the Administration's
"Listing of Impairments," a grouping of impairments and the symp-
toms necessary to show the requisite severity.34 If a particular impair-
ment does not meet the listing standards, then the claimant must show
a combination of impairments that is severe enough to prevent the con-
tinuation of past relevant work.35 After the claimant shows an inability
to perform past relevant work, a shifting of burdens occurs and the
government must show the existence of other work that the claimant is
physically and vocationally capable of performing. 36 The courts have
been reluctant, however, to apply any burdens strictly in light of the
non-adversary nature of the proceedings. 37 Courts generally require
four elements of proof relevant to a finding of disability outside of the
31. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 1601-1602, 86 Stat. 1465.
See note I supra.
32. [1979] SOCIAL SECURITY ADM. ANN. REP. 2, 5. In 1979 more than 30 million people
received almost $90 billion through the retirement and survivors insurance program, and approxi-
mately 27 million people received almost $20 billion in basic Medicare benefits. Id. at 1, 6.
33. See 45 Fed. Reg. 55588 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
34. Id. at 55598 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. subpart P, appendix 1). Thus, the listing for
asthma requires a certain level of air obstruction, depending on height, or episodes of attacks
lasting at least several hours and requiring intensive treatment which occur at least once every two
months or six times a year, despite treatment, together with "prolonged expiration with wheezing
or rhonchi between attacks." Id. at 55602 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 3.03, subpart P, appendix
1).
35. Id. at 55588 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)). Past relevant work is ordinarily
limited to work performed within the past fifteen years. Id. at 55591 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1565(a)).
36. See, e.g., Hall v. Secretary of HEW, 602 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979); Stark v. Wein-
berger, 497 F.2d 1092, 1098 (7th Cir. 1974); Meneses v. Secretary of HEW, 442 F.2d 803, 806
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. See Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974) (recognizing that al-
though claimant has the burden of proving disability, "due regard for the beneficent purposes of
the legislation requires that a more tolerant standard be used. . . than. . . where the adversary
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Listing of Impairments: first, objective medical facts; second, diagnoses
or opinions based on such facts; third, subjective evidence of symptoms
of disability, such as pain, from the claimant and other witnesses; and
fourth, the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 38
Often, the Secretary will have to use a vocational expert to present
sufficient evidence concerning the effect of the vocational factors on the
claimant's ability to work.39 Since 1978, the Administration has used a
set of "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" in an attempt to simplify deter-
minations when vocational factors may show an inability to perform
substantial gainful activity.' The guidelines consider the claimant's
residual physical capacity to perform, for example, sedentary or light
work, and incorporate certain key vocational information. Thus, ex-
pert evidence must be introduced in many cases as to the nature of the
claimant's previous employment and the transferability of any skills
that the claimant may have developed.4'
3. The Disability Determination Process
Applicants file for disability benefits at local offices of the Social Se-
curity Administration.42  A state agency under contract with the Ad-
ministration 43 makes the initial determination of eligibility. A team
including at least one medical doctor issues a decision based on a writ-
system prevails"). See also Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979); Miranda v.
Secretary of HEW, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975).
38. See DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1972); Gold v. Secretary of HEW,
463 F.2d 38, 41 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court held that a written report by a licensed
physician who examined the claimant can constitute substantial evidence for a finding against the
claimant given the claimant's ability to subpoena witnesses. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
402 (1971). Cf. Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1980) (denial based only on reports
by non.examining doctors held not supported by substantial evidence).
39. See, e.g., O'Banner v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1978); Watson v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 478 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See also text accompanying notes 151-52 infra.
40. 45 Fed. Reg. 55617 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. subpart P, appendix 2). The
guidelines recently withstood a broad constitutional and statutory attack. See Stallings v. Harris,
493 F. Supp. 956, 957-61 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
41. 45 Fed. Reg. at 55617 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. subpart P, appendix 2). See also
Gilliam v. Califano, 620 F.2d 691,694 (8th Cir. 1980); Hicks v. Califano, 600 F.2d 1048, 1051 (4th
Cir. 1979).
42. 20 C.F.R. § 404.614 (1980). Applications also can be filed elsewhere under certain cir-
cumstances. Id. See also SOCIAL SECURrY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, SSA CLAIMS MANUAL § 2035 [hereinafter cited as CLAIMS MANUAL].
43. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a) (1976). State agency participation is at the option of the states. Recent
amendments add authority for the Secretary to hold states to a performance standard. See 1980
Amendments, supra note 2, § 304(b) at 454.
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ten record that should contain, in addition to the initial application,
reports by the claimant's physicians and copies of other relevant medi-
cal records.44 Claimants are expected and obliged to participate with
Administration personnel in the gathering of relevant information. 45
Claimants found ineligible can request a reconsideration, which is an
internal review of the record, and submit additional evidence into the
record.46
After denial of reconsideration, the claimant can request a hearing
before an administrative law judge in which the claimant can be repre-
sented by an attorney or other authorized representative. 47 A prehear-
ing case review can be held, at which time the determination can be
reversed or revised,48 or the case can be remanded for further consider-
ation by the state agency if the judge feels a favorable decision could be
rendered on the record, including any additional evidence submitted in
preparation for the hearing.49 After deciding that a hearing will be
conducted, the administrative law judge is expected to note inadequa-
cies or conflicts in the evidence, decide whether further evidence should
be developed by the claimant or from some other source, decide
whether to call a vocational or medical expert at the hearing, and note
any questions of law or policy that need to be researched.5 0 The judge
must also select proposed exhibits from the record5' and identify the
issues to be resolved at the hearing. 2 If the medical evidence is defi-
cient or in conflict, the judge is to secure additional information from
44. See H. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 525. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 336-39 (1976). Recent amendments require that decisions unfavorable to the claimant be
communicated in "understandable language," setting forth the evidence considered and the rea-
sons for the decision. 1980 Amendments, supra note 2, § 305 at 457.
45. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 55586-88 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512-
.1518).
46. Id. at 52082 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.907); CLAIMS MANuAL, supra note 42,
§ 7120. Reconsideration is the first appeal stage for all OASDI claims; in circumstances not rele-
vant here, SSI decisions may be subject first to an informal conference with a decisionmaker
where witnesses can be presented. Id. at 52098-99 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1414-.1416).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976); 45 Fed. Reg. at 52084, 52086 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.929, .950(a)).
48. Id. at 52085 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.941).
49. OFFmCE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, OHA HANDBOOK §§ 1-300,-340 [hereinafter cited as OHA
HANDBOOK].
50. Id.
51. Id. § 1-344.
52. Id. § 1-341.
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the treating source or order a consultative examination by an in-
dependent physician.5" Additionally, the judge should determine
whether additional non-medical evidence is needed,54 and if necessary,
secure a vocational expert and subpoena other relevant witnesses. 55 Fi-
nally, a prehearing conference can be held to narrow the matters in
dispute 6.5  Administrative law judges are assigned staff to assist in ob-
taining additional evidence and preparing the case for hearing. 7
Claimants can examine the record compiled by the judge at any time
prior to the hearing. 8
At the hearing, the administrative law judge is expected to look
"fully into the issues" and receive all relevant testimony and evidence
offered.5 9 The judges question witnesses and allow claimants or their
representatives to do the same.6 Claimants are able to present an oral
or written closing argument.6 ' Before terminating the hearing, the ad-
ministrative law judge should ask if the claimant wishes to present any
additional evidence and, if so, leave the record open for the submission
of such evidence.6 2 The judge issues a written decision based on the
53. Id. § 1-510. The judge can request examination by specific institutions or physicians, id.
§ 1-513, as well as specific diagnostic procedures, 1d. § 1-514. The claimant's physicians can be
served with a subpoena, if necessary. Id. § 1-524. A refusal by the claimant to cooperate can be a
basis for denial. See 45 Fed. Reg. 55587 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1518); Kaminski
v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 367, 371 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.), a'dmem. 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979).
54. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at § 1-530.
55. Expert vocational testimony can be obtained at the hearing, or in the form of written
interrogatories. Id. §§ 1-531, -531-20. Administrative lawjudges can subpoena relevant witnesses
on their own initiative or on request of a claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1976); 45 Fed. Reg. 52086
(1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)). The local Social Security office should assist
judges in locating witnesses. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at § 1-571.
56. 45 Fed. Reg. 52087 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.961). OHA HANDBOOK, supra note
49, at § 1-349.
57. Staff can prepare abstracts of the evidence and assist the judge in obtaining missing evi-
dence, OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at §§ 1-345, -346, and can hold prehearing conferences,
id. § 1-349.
58. Id. § 1-348.
59. 45 Fed. Reg. 52085 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.944). The judge also can
adjourn the hearing to receive additional evidence not available at the hearing. Id. The hearing
itself can be waived, and the decision made on the basis of the written record. Id. at 52085-86 (to
be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.948).
60. Id. at 52086 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(e)). Judges are instructed to do the
initial questioning themselves. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at § 1-656-20.
61. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at § 1-657; 45 Fed. Reg. 52086 (to be codified in 20
C.F.R. § 404.949).
62. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at §§ 1-658, -660.
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record developed before and at the hearing.63
The next stage in the process is review by the Appeals Council,
which is a centralized review board located in Washington, D.C.64 A
request for review by the Appeals Council can be made by the claim-
ant, the Administration, or on the Appeals Council's own motion. 5
Although review is limited essentially to cases containing an error of
law or lack of substantial evidence to support the decision, "new and
material evidence" can be submitted and will be evaluated if there was
no hearing, or, if there was a hearing, may lead to a remand for further
consideration by the Administration.16 Appeals Council determina-
tions become "final decisions" of the Secretary that can be appealed in
the federal district courts.67 The district courts determine whether the
Secretary's decision, usually the written decision of the administrative
law judge, is supported by "substantial evidence."68 The court affirms,
reverses, or remands the case, and bases its decision on the record com-
piled by the administrative law judge, or, in those cases reviewed by the
Appeals Council, on the record compiled by the Appeals Council.6 9
B. The Minimum Requirements of the Disability Determination
Process: A Complete Record and a Full and Fair Hearing
The prehearing disability process described in the preceding section
should produce a complete record of a claimant's physical and mental
condition. Even if some records are not properly developed by the time
63. 45 Fed. Reg. 52086 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.953(a)). A short form decision can
be filed in cases decided completely in the claimant's favor. OHA HANDBOOK, .supra note 49, at
§ 1-824.
64. See generall, H. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, at §§ 599-604.
65. 45 Fed. Reg. 52087-88 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.969).
66. Id. at 52088 (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.970). See also 1980 Amendments, supra
note 2, § 306 at 457. Appeals Council review is actually in two stages. The request for review is
filed and if that request is granted, then the decision is either affirmed, modified, reversed, or
remanded. -d. (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.971, .979). Although parties can appear before
the Appeals Council following its decision to grant review, courts have been concerned about
Appeals Council decisions based on new evidence when claimants do not appear. See, e.g.,
Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712,714 (7th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Weinberger, 356 F. Supp. 954,
955, 957-58 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
68. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Id., quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
69. See text accompanying notes 104-11 infra for further discussion of courts' authority to
remand.
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a hearing is held, a complete record should result from the hearing
given the available procedures and the administrative law judges' re-
sponsibilities under applicable regulations. Records are often incom-
plete, however, both before and after an administrative hearing has
occurred.70 Although this result is troubling relative to the poor quality
of prehearing development, the incompleteness of posthearing records
is truly startling considering the role administrative law judges are ex-
pected to perform. The result is understandable, however, when one
considers the role advocacy can play in this process and the fact that in
most cases the claimant, and in all cases the government, is unrepre-
sented.71 Professor Davis states that the "two main facts" about Social
Security hearings are the administrative law judges' responsibility to
develop both sides of the record and the nonrepresentation of claimants
in most cases.7" The manner in which these facts affect the hearing
process is the subject of this section.
1. The Role of the Administrative Law Judge
The Social Security administrative law judge "does not act as coun-
sel. He acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts. 73 Al-
70. Through the administrative hearing level "there is probably more inconsistency in devel-
opment effort than in decisional outcome." SOCIAL SEcuRrrY HEARING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at
48-49. See also IssuEs RELATED TO DISABILITY PROoRAMS, supra note 2, at 47. Popkin found
that the presentation of new evidence is a significant factor in successful disability appeals.
Popkin, supra note 1, at 1032-34. See also 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 246-47 (Commis-
sioner of Social Security Administration agreeing that poorly developed cases are a problem sug-
gesting a need for earlier and "more careful development of the claimant's case"); id. at 250-51
(Commissioner noting that administrative law judges often are presented with an entirely new
case to review because the records are poorly developed at the initial levels).
The distinction drawn between before and after the administrative hearing separates the initial
determination and reconsideration levels of the process, which are handled exclusively by the
Social Security Administration and the state agency, from the administrative hearing level in
which independent administrative law judges become involved. See text accompanying notes 42-
63 supra. Accordingly, the relevant beginning of the hearing process is when the appeal is re-
quested and the file transferred to the Office of Hearings and Appeals.
71. In the 1977 fiscal year, 31% of all SSI claimants and 42% of all OASDI claimants were
represented at hearings. Kochhar, 4ppeals Under the SSI Progranv January 1974-August 1976,
Soc. SEC. BULL., April 1979, at 24, 28. The breakdown by type of representative is: 16% attorney
and 15% non-attorney for SSI claimants; 34% attorney and 8% non-attorney for OASDI claimants.
Id.
72. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 109 (Supp. 1978).
73. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). The responsibility to develop a complete
and useful record is also accepted by non-Social Security administrative law judges. See, eg.,
Estate of Lucille Mathilda Callous Leg Ireland, 78 I.D. 66, 69-70 (1971) (Department of Interior
administrative proceeding probating Indian estate); Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Ad-
Washington University Open Scholarship
364 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:349
though views vary as to how this charge is to be carried out,
74
administrative law judges are expected to decide disability claims on
the basis of a complete record and following a full and fair hearing.
Moreover, their decisions must be based on the record, and not on facts
or inferences developed or assumed on their own.75
The minimum requirements of a complete record and full and fair
hearing apply whether claimants are represented or not.76 The nature
of the administrative law judge's role in meeting these minimum re-
quirements changes, however, when claimants are not represented.
"[I]n administrative proceedings in which rights and privileges are in
issue and the guiding hand of counsel is not present to advocate their
existence, a duty devolves on the hearing examiner to scrupulously and
conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all of the rele-
vant facts."'7 7 Moreover, judges are expected to have sufficient exper-
ministrative Law Judge, 25 AD. L. Rav. 9, 14 (1973) (author Chief Administrative Law Judge for
the Federal Power Commission). Some notable trial judges have expressed concern about their
traditionally inactive fact development role. See Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1052-59 (1975); Wyzanski,.4 Trial Judge'r Freedom andResponsi-
bility, 65 HI-Lv. L. Rav. 1281, 1283-93 (1952). Cf. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of
the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1, 52-80 (1978) (argues against trial judges becoming
more active in questioning witnesses and controlling trial).
74. Most commentators argue for a more active role in developing the record. See, eg., B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 253-54; J. MASHAW, et al., supra note 3, at 69-73; Zwerdling, supra
note 73, at 27. Professor Schwartz argues that Social Security administrative law judges cannot be
as neutral as the language from Richardson v. Perales, quotedin text accompanying note 73 supra,
suggests because a claim must have been denied twice (initial determination and reconsideration)
before it gets to a hearing, thus indicating a "plausible case against the claimant." B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 12, at 254.
75. Thus, cases were remanded when the administrative law judge relied on administrative
notice, Kenny v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 393, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), unsubstantiated adverse
inferences, Flores v. Department of HEW, 465 F. Supp. 317, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), and his own
observations of a claimant's capacity to work, Wiginton v. Secretary of HEW, 470 F. Supp. 235,
237 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
76. See, eg., Gilliam v. Califano, 620 F.2d 691, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1980); Thome v. Califano,
607 F.2d 218,219 (8th Cir. 1979); Kelley v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ind. 1974);
Garrett v. Richardson, 363 F. Supp. 83, 90 (D.S.C. 1973). When a claimant is represented, the
administrative law judge should give the representative "wide latitude" in cross-examining wit-
nesses. See Trice v. Weinberger, 392 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
77. Hennig v. Gardner, 276 F. Supp. 622, 624 (N.D. Tex. 1967). This language is often
quoted by other courts. See, eg., Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978); Smith v.
Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1978); Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43
(2d Cir. 1972). See also Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979) ("heightened
duty of care" and "responsibility to assume a more active role" when claimants are unrepre-
sented). A similar responsibility exists when claimants are unrepresented at hearings involving
nondisability issues. See, e.g, Farmer v. Mathews, 584 F.2d 796, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1978) (cause of
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tise and experience to fulfill the role properly.7"
There are two different aspects to the administrative law judge's re-
sponsibility to reach a decision based on a complete record and follow-
ing a full and fair hearing. First, a complete written record must be
developed; and second, all relevant facts and issues must be presented
by proper questioning and cross-examination of appropriate witnesses,
including the claimant, and by competent legal argument. Many courts
have recognized the development aspect of the administrative law
judge's responsibility;79 the duty to compile and develop a complete
record is one that is shared with others during the disability determina-
tion process. The presentation aspect, however, is unique to the admin-
istrative law judge because the hearing is the only opportunity for the
claimant and other witnesses to meet face-to-face with a decision
maker.8" Administrative law judges are put in a difficult position rela-
tive to the presentation aspect of their responsibility. On the one hand,
they are expected to fill any gaps in the record favorable to claimants
yet overlooked by claimants or their representatives by calling, ques-
tioning, and cross-examining all relevant witnesses and covering all po-
death for black lung benefits); Barnes v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (fa-
ther-child relationship for survivors benefits). Some courts express the responsibilitiy in less active
terms. See, e.g., Warmijak v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 441, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("[N]ot without
responsibility for developing a complete and accurate factual record"); Stewart v. Cohen, 309 F.
Supp. 949, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ("a duty not to be a mere umpire, but to see that all relevant facts
are developed"). Cf. Saldana v. Weinberger, 421 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court dis-
approves of "the AL's narrow view of his role").
78. See Parker v. Califano, 441 F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (claimant represented).
Although Social Security judges must have seven years of "qualifying experience" and must par-
ticipate in an extensive preappointment review, ISSUES RELATED TO DISABILITY PROGRAMS,
supra note 2, at 45, the quality of federal administrative law judges is the subject of controversy.
See generally Scalia, The AL. Fiasco--A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979). Attempts to
monitor the performance of Social Security administrative law judges have been resisted. See
Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980); IssuES RELATED TO DISABILITY PROGRAMS, supra
note 2, at 40-41. Cf. Chassman & Rolston, supra note 6, at 808-09, 817-21 (authors note adminis-
trative law judges' concern about monitoring of their decisions but report that recent implementa-
tion of a quality assurance system shows that the review of certain error-prone categories of
disability determinations to assure that records do not indicate a serious error may be valuable).
New authority to monitor the entire disability determination process was enacted recently. See
1980 Amendments, supra note 2, § 304 at 453-57.
79. See text accompanying notes 130-52 infra.
80. One of the clearest findings of a recent survey of administrative law judges is their almost
unanimous opinion (92%) that their ability to judge pain and general credibility through face-to-
face evaluations is a very important element of the hearing process. Only 2% responded that the
confrontations are not important. SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 3, at 46.
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tential legal theories of disability."' On the other hand, although they
can call certain witnesses in support of the government's case, such as
vocational experts, and question claimants and other witnesses on facts
unfavorable to claimants, they must advocate on behalf of the govern-
ment in an essentially neutral manner.82
The dual realities that administrative law judges often do not advo-
cate effectively for claimants and cannot advocate fully on behalf of the
Social Security Administration can lead to the simple recommendation
that representatives should be provided for both sides.8 3 Indeed, a
move to an adversary system has been suggested as a means of resolv-
ing some of the difficulties faced by administrative law judges in devel-
oping and presenting disability claims.8 4 To make a meaningful
recommendation, however, one must know what the representatives'
role would be.
81. See text accompanying notes 153-70 infra. As the number of district court remands sug-
gests, see note 7 supra, administrative law judges do not always fulfill this responsibility. See J.
MASHAw, et al., supra note 3, at 82-87. Some courts require only that claimants be advised as to
how they should present their own case. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Secretary of HEW, 585 F.2d 551,
554 (1st Cir. 1978) (offer claimant opportunity to ask questions of witness); Hess v. Secretary of
HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1974) (advise claimant of importance of full and accurate medi-
cal evidence and allow claimant to submit such evidence after hearing); Warmijak v. Califano,
465 F. Supp. 441,443 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (advise claimant of importance of full and accurate medical
evidence and allow claimant to submit such evidence after hearing).
82. Thus, administrative law judges have been rebuffed for "badgering" a claimant and "urg-
ing and leading" him to admit he could perform a job he knew nothing about, Floyd v. Finch, 441
F.2d 73, 95 (6th Cir. 197 1) (McAllister, J., dissenting), for "overzealous" adverse questioning of a
claimant, Concepcion v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.P.R. 1971), and for "em-
ploy[ing] expert questioning to write a record exclusively favorable to the government's side of the
case," Copley v. Richardson, 475 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Griffin v. Califano, 478
F. Supp. 564, 565 (D.S.C. 1979) (disability benefits hearing "metamorphasized" into an employ-
ment interview because the administrative law judge "attempted to help [the claimant] out of his
predicament by finding him a job"); Puckett v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 364, 366 (W.D. Va. 1976)
(administrative law judge's request for additional x-ray reading in black lung benefits case criti-
cized as "unwarranted and improper" because one government doctor had already confirmed
necessary diagnosis).
83. See Kaufman, District Court Review of Department ofHealth, Education and Welfare De-
cisions, 26 AD. L. REv. 113, 116 (1974) (suggests that both claimants and the government should
be represented by "para-counsel" so the administrative law judge "could devote himself solely to
being a judge"). The author, a United States district judge, has indicated his belief that claimants
should be represented by counsel. See Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D. Md. 1976).
84. See Yourman, supra note 19, at 135 (adversary system can avoid problems of maintain-
ing administrative law judge impartiality when cross-examination of claimants or their witnesses
required). The proposed government representative experiment would have moved to a more
adversarial system. See text accompanying notes 199-204 infra.
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2. The Role of the Representative
One view is that no role exists for representatives in Social Security
disability hearings; 5 today, most commentators disagree with this posi-
tion. 6 Thus, Professor Popkin in his 1977 study on the effect of repre-
sentation at non-adversary proceedings, including those for Social
Security disability benefits, found that claimants were more successful
when represented and concluded that although attorneys may tend to
take the better cases, "a more plausible explanation is that counsel can
skillfully organize evidence to prove a case."' 87 Moreover, the advan-
tage of representation was found to be limited in Social Security cases
to the hearing stage, which has become the most important stage of the
process in an increasingly large number of cases because the prehearing
stages are less effective and the claimant is more likely to be denied
benefits on initial determination and following reconsideration. 8
85. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.10 at 193 (Supp. 1965) ("The ex-
aminer is accustomed to developing the records without assistance of counsel on either side.
When counsel does represent a claimant, usually he is useless to the examiner and a needless
expense to the claimant").
86. See authorities cited note 13 supra. The disability determination process that Professor
Davis considered in 1965 is far different from the present process. In 1965, 23,323 hearing re-
quests were received, 71.1% of those cases were favorable to the government, and 68.7% of the
cases appealed to the district courts were either affirmed or dismissed. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN-
ISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS FOR THE BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND
APPEALS 17, 18, 29 (1973). In 1979, 226,240 hearing requests were received (including 49,531 SSI
cases), 47% resulted in decisions favorable to the government, and approximately 50% of the cases
appealed to the district courts were either affirmed or dismissed. 1979 FACT SHEET, supra note 6,
at 2, 4.
87. Popkin, supra note 1, at 1032-33. Cf. Yourman, supra note 19, at 168-69 (attorneys can
be helpful but rarely affect the outcome). Of course, some claimants with strong cases may pro-
ceed without representation because they feel they can and do win without counsel. See Mashaw,
supra note 13, at 790 n.52.
88. Representation is not relevant at the initial determination stage, and therefore initial de-
terminations were not included in the Popkin study. He did find, however, that "represented
claimants did not have an advantage [at] the Social Security reconsideration stage." Popkin, supra
note I, at 1026. Although the percentage of initial OASDI disability claims approved has dropped
slightly during the past five years and the percentage of reconsideration decisions favorable to
claimants has dropped by one-half, [1979] SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. ANN. REP. 2; [1975] SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMIN. ANN. REP. 2, the percentage of hearing decisions favorable to claimants in-
creased from 41.9% in 1975 to 53% in 1979. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEW, OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 25 (1978); 1979
FACT SHEET, supra note 6, at 2. At a recent meeting the Social Security administrative law judges'
ALl Policy Council requested that the Commissioner of Social Security be advised of their "con-
cern that the pressure being applied to the State Agencies at the Reconsideration Level, to sup-
press the number of reversals, is increasing the workload of OHA and artificially and
counterproductively inflating the number of OHA reversal decisions which should have been dis-
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Although Popkin found that the addition of new evidence is the most
important element of a successful disability appeal, he also found that
represented claimants are more likely to present new evidence 9 and
that represented claimants are advantaged even when no new evidence
is presented at the hearing.90"An earlier study also found a greater suc-
cess rate for represented claimants, but declined to offer an explana-
tion.91 A 1978 report by The National Center for Administrative
Justice recognizes the value of representation in disability hearings, but
suggests that the administrative law judge should retain control of the
presentation of the case.92 Obviously, the actions of the administrative
law judge in any particular case affect the role of the representative or
the need for one at all,93 and the presence of a representative is mean-
ingless if the representation is ineffective. 94 Although these studies tend
to look at the process from the claimants' point of view, the general
conclusions are also relevant to the development and presentation of
the government's case. Moreover, the premise of the proposed govern-
ment representative experiment was that representation benefits the
government in developing and presenting its case.95
A general conclusion that representation is effective at disability
posed of favorably by reconsideration decision-makers." Memorandum from Chairman of the
ALJ Policy Council to Administrative Law Judges 2 (August 4, 1980).
89. Popkin, supra note 1, at 1029-3 1. The study considers only new evidence presented at the
hearing itself. Id. at 1021-22, chart 7, note k.
90. Id. at 1032.
91. Boyd & Johnson, supra note 13, at 103-04.
92. J. MASHAW, et al., supra note 3, at 73. The need for administrative law judges to retain
control is particularly true when the representative is not well prepared. Id. See also note 94
infra.
93. Compare Clemmons v. Weinberger, 416 F. Supp. 623, 625 (W.D. Mo. 1976) ("Many
cases have recognized the handicap under which the unrepresented claimant labors and of which
the administrative law judge must not take advantage") with Toledo v. Secretary of HEW, 435
F.2d 1297, 1297 (1st Cir. 1971) ("There is no suggestion that having counsel would have resulted
in the presentation of any better case. It is quite apparent. . . that plaintiff was fairly treated;
indeed the examiner was exceptionally solicitious and helpful').
94. Ineffective representation is a serious problem in disability hearings. See, e.g., Arms v.
Gardner, 353 F.2d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 1965) (attorney did not examine witnesses or offer any testi-
mony on claimant's behalf, and admitted to very little knowledge of Social Security law); Law-
rence v. Harris, 2 Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 1 30694 (N.D. In. 1980) (nonattorney antagonized
administrative law judge, obfuscated issues, and blocked full development of the record); Tillman
v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (ineffective nonattorney substituting
for attorney who did not appear). Cf. Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1179, 1180 (6th Cir. 1970) (Mc-
Cree, J., dissenting) (nonattorney was effective and experienced "unlike the attorney in Arms v.
Gardner"). See generally J. MASHAW, et al., supra note 3, at 92-93.
95. See text accompanying notes 205-07 infra.
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hearings does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a representa-
tive is always necessary or even useful. Popkin concludes that although
representatives are effective in compiling new evidence, there is less
need for representation when medical issues predominate because the
agency can collect most medical records and reports, and less need ex-
ists for argument concerning those relatively technical facts. 96 On the
other hand, he finds that "a representative's skills in producing and
marshalling evidence can markedly benefit the claimant" 97 when less
technical issues are at stake, and he attributes the lack of disadvantage
to unrepresented claimants at the reconsideration stage to the impor-
tance of written medical reports, reviewed by doctors, in the reconsid-
eration decisionmaking process.9" Others conclude that representation
is particularly appropriate in complex cases,99 when additional reports
must be obtained,"° and when active investigation is required. 10 1
After consideration of the respective roles of administrative law
judges and representatives, a significant potential overlap appears be-
tween the two roles. Roles have been suggested for administrative law
judges and representatives which cover both the development of a rec-
ord and the presentation of a case and roles have been suggested for
representatives that would, if performed, meet the major concerns
about the administrative law judges' advocacy role. In the following
section the manner in which administrative law judges actually exercise
their responsibilities is examined from the courts' perspective in decid-
ing whether a case should be remanded for further consideration when
that decision is based on an evaluation whether a claimant's disability
was determined on the basis of a complete record and following a full
and fair hearing. The decisions show what aspects of representation,
when omitted, are fundamental to the fulfillment of the minimum re-
quirements of the disability determination process.
96. Popkin, supra note 1, at 1027.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1026-27.
99. Yourman, supra note 19, at 135-38.
100. Id. at 168-69.
101. J. MAsHAW, et al., supra note 3, at 98.
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C. Satisfying the Minimum Requirements Without Representatives:
The Courts'Approach To Remands IWhen Claimants Were
Unrepresented at Hearing
The high rate of remands of disability decisions by the federal courts
is evidence of the poor quality of the disability determination pro-
cess. 1 2 Although part of the blame can be laid on the broad language
of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, which authorizes re-
mands,"°3 and on the courts' eagerness to use the remand device to
avoid deciding the merits one way or the other, the courts' approach, or
more correctly stated, the courts' approaches, to remands when claim-
ants were unrepresented at their disability hearing has contributed to
the high remand rate. To the extent that the courts have good reason to
order a large number of remands, the problem is indeed the poor quali-
ty of the hearing process and not an overuse of section 205(g). Re-
mands are ordered not because a claimant was unrepresented, but
rather because one aspect or another of the administrative law judge's
(or absent representative's) advocacy role was not fulfilled. The great
number of remands indicates that change is required to meet the advo-
cacy needs of non-adversary hearings not met by the present system.
1. Remands and Concern About Overuse
Many commentators believe that the broad language of section
205(g), which allows for remands requested by the Secretary, by the
claimant, or on the court's own motion, has led to an overuse of that
relief."° Until recently, the Secretary had absolute authority to re-
mand a case to an administrative law judge after a review proceeding
had been filed in the district court, even before the government filed an
answer. 105 This authority caused great concern because the ability to
obtain a remand reduced the government's incentive to develop claims
carefully and fully during all the pre-court stages of the process, includ-
ing the administrative hearing."w The 1980 amendments to the Act
102. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976). See text accompanying notes 104-10 infra.
104. See generally J. MASHAW, et al., supra note 3, at 132-36. Professor Mashaw feels that
section 205(g) gives district courts "an almost unbounded discretion to set aside the administrative
decision and order an enlargement of the record." Id. at 133.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
106. J. MASHAw, et al., supra note 3, at 131-32. See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL
SECURITY, HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., DISABILITY INSUR-
ANcE-POSSIBLE AREAS OF SuBCOmMITTEE ACTION 9-10 (Comm. Print 1978).
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attempt to deal with the problem by requiring the Secretary to show
good cause.10 7 Although a good cause requirement for remands re-
quested by the claimant or ordered by the courts on their own motion
has always existed,' 8 the requirement has been applied in many differ-
ent ways with no definitive interpretation available for the courts to use
as a guide. °9 The recent amendments clarify the good cause require-
ment as it applies to the availability of new evidence as a basis for
remand. Under the amendments one must now show that "there is new
evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure
to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding."' '1 0
One basis for remands not affected by the 1980 amendments involve
cases in which the claimant alleges that a full and fair hearing was not
provided. Although the new amendments concerning remands could
be thought to apply regardless of the quality of the original hearing, or
the record developed before or at the hearing, the legislative history
supports the view that the availability of remands because of a failure
to provide the minimum requirements of a complete record and a full
and fair hearing remains unaffected. "I The confirmation of the lack of
107. See 1980 Amendments, supra note 2, § 307, 94 Stat. 458. The amendment is designed to
meet these objections. See H.R. REP. No. 96-100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as 1979 House Report]; S. REP. No. 96-408, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
1979 Senate Report].
108. This language also was changed recently. See text accompanying note 110 infra. The
language before the 1980 amendments was: "The court. . . may, at any time, on good cause
shown, order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
109. Good cause for a remand was found recently when substantial evidence did not exist to
support the decision of the Secretary, Currier v. Secretary of HEW, 612 F.2d 594, 597 (1st Cir.
1980), when insufficient evidence existed to find for or against the claimant, Johnson v. Harris, 612
F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1980), without requiring that new evidence might affect the Secretary's
decision, Strayhorn v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1979), and without any partic-
ular reason given, Michel v. Califano, 480 F. Supp. 195, 198 (M.D. La. 1979). Cf. Webb v. Finch,
431 F.2d 1179, 1180 (6th Cir. 1970) (McCree, J., dissenting) ("the fact that a more effective presen-
tation could be made in a second effort is not the 'good cause' required by [Section 205(g)] as a
predicate for remand"). See generally H. McCoMicK, supra note 20, §§ 752-58.
110. 1980 Amendments, supra note 2, § 307, 94 Stat. 458.
111. The House report states explicitly that the new amendment "is not to be construed as a
limitation ofjudicial remands currently recognized under the law in cases which the Secretary has
failed to provide a full and fair hearing, to make explicit findings, or to have correctly apply [sic]
the law and regulations." 1979 House Report, supra note 107, at 13. See also 1979 House Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 119 (statement by legal services attorneys urging that legislative history of
remand amendments, which they supported generally, show that limitations do not apply where
there was no full and fair hearing). Although the Senate report does not address this issue, it notes
that many remands are justified and takes issue with those remands ordered "because the judge
disagrees with the outcome of the case even though he would have to sustain it under the 'substan-
Number 2]
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full and fair hearing basis for remands supports the suggestion that re-
mands correct, rather than pervert, the process. The new amendments,
however, do not offer any better guide to determine whether a full and
fair hearing was provided or whether a remand is required.
2. Remand When Claimant Unrepresented at Hearing:
General Rule
Although a claimant can argue that a full and fair hearing was not
provided despite the presence of a representative,"1 2 or on grounds un-
related to whether a representative was present,1 1 3 most such argu-
ments are raised by claimants who were unrepresented at the original
hearing. A lack of representation by itself, however, is not grounds for
a remand. 14 Such a rule is necessary as long as the right to representa-
tial evidence rule.' " 1979 Senate Report, supra note 107, at 58. The case of Parker v. Califano,
441 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1977), may be of a type that Congress had in mind. Although the
claimant was represented at the hearing and the court found there was substantial evidence to
support the decision to deny benefits, the case was remanded for further evidence because a new
report by a clinical psychologist was presented that tended to show a greater psychological impair-
ment than indicated on the record. Cf. Williams v. Secretary of HEW, 481 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (remand because tape recording of hearing inaudible).
Concern about a misuse of the "substantial evidence" rule in these cases also has surfaced as
indicated by the quotation from 1979 Senate Report, supra note 107, at 58. See also STAFF RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 79-82. A proposal to require affirmance of the Secretary's decisions unless
"arbitrary and capricious" was adopted by the Senate as part of the 1980 amendments, but
dropped in conference. See 1979 Senate Report, supra note 93, at 58-59; 1980 Conference Report,
supra note 3, at 61. The administration also considered presenting a proposal limiting district
court review of Social Security decision to questions of law or constitutional interpretation. See
1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 53-54, 69, 82. A related proposal for a special disability
court was disavowed by the administration. Id. at 83.
112. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
113. Thus, many courts hold that a full and fair hearing is not provided when administrative
law judges fail to support their decisions with a clear analysis of the relevant facts and laws. See,
eg., Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1979); Storck v. Weinberger, 402 F. Supp.
603, 608 (D. Md. 1975); Davis v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 813, 816 (M.D. Pa. 1975). Cf. Johnson
v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 302, 308-09 (D. Md. 1977) (rejects argument that detailed statement of
reasons and analysis of decision was required; claimant was represented at hearing by an attor-
ney). Administrative law judges have been rebuffed for basing decisions on medical texts in-
dependent of the evidence in the record. See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.
1975); Ross v. Gardner, 365 F.2d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1966). In McCray v. Califano, 483 F. Supp.
128 (M.D. La. 1980), the case was remanded because the administrative law judge based his deci-
sion on facts taken on administrative notice after the hearing. The claimant was represented and
the court found the judge's action defeated the purpose of representation since the attorney's skills
were "wasted." Id. at 131.
114. See, eg., Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979); Smith v. Secretary
of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1978).
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tion is limited to the right to bring one's own representative, not to have
a representative appointed and compensated by the government.11 5
Some courts express in general terms what must be shown in addi-
tion to a lack of representation at the original hearing to obtain a re-
mand. Thus, a number of courts require that "a clear prejudice or
unfairness" be shown;"I6 others look to whether a representative could
have presented a better case.'1 7 Despite instances in which courts effec-
tively eliminate the requirement of an additional showing of harm by
finding that the fact of nonrepresentation itself shows significant
115. There must be, of course, a waiver of the claimant's right to be represented. Compare
Kennedy v. Finch, 317 F. Supp. 7, 8 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ("the lack of counsel is not a sufficient cause
for remand. . . . especially. . . where the claimant has affirmatively waived his right to counsel")
with Schlabach v. Secretary of HEW, 469 F. Supp. 304, 311 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (waiver ineffective
because had claimant "been able to understand the legal aspects and consequences of the proceed-
ing, he probably would have retained counsel").
A waiver is particularly suspect if the claimant suffers from a mental condition. See, e.g.,
Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1980); Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 860 (7th cir. 1978). Cf. Vega v. Secretary of
HEW, 321 F. Supp. 553, 554 (D.P.R. 1970) (claimant with mental condition afforded the opportu-
nity to bring counsel but chose to appear alone).
Many courts hold that a waiver is ineffective unless the claimant is informed of all sources of
free legal services that may be available. See, e.g., Brooks v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 1341, 1345
(D. Del. 1977); Clemmons v. Weinberger, 416 F. Supp. 623, 625 n.l (W.D. Mo. 1976); Rosa v.
Weinberger, 381 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Cf. Reed v. Califano, 489 F. Supp. 1026
(E.D. Tenn. 1980) (brochure describing various sources of representation held sufficient); Clark v.
Califano, 476 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (mailed notice indicating claimant would be sup-
plied list of attorneys if wanted representation and could not afford it, held sufficient). See also
Flores v. Department of HEW, 465 F. Supp. 317, 321 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("the examiner could
have been more helpful" as he did not respond when claimant indicated that no attorney was
present because he could not afford one).
The Tenth Circuit implied recently that courts requiring a knowing waiver of free representa-
tion would remand only if the hearing was otherwise incomplete or unfair. Garcia v. Califano,
625 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1980). On the other hand, an effective waiver does not preclude a
remand when there has not been a full and fair hearing. See, e.g., Fessler v. Mathews, 417 F.
Supp. 570, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the court indicated the administrative law judge had
"duly noted" that the claimant was entitled to be represented yet she indicated she would proceed
without assistance; nonetheless, the court remanded the case because a complete record had not
been compiled.
116. See, eg., Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 840 n.4 (3d Cir. 1974); Goodman v.
Richardson, 448 F.2d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Sykes v. Finch, 443 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1971).
117. See Brooks v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (D. Del. 1977) ("no showing that the
record... was not fully developed, or that there are serious information gaps in the record which
could have been filled had counsel been present"); Acevedo v. Secretary of HEW, 372 F. Supp.
455, 459 (D.P.R. 1973) ("no suggestion that having counsel would have resulted in the presenta-
tion of a better case"); Truss v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 741, 743 (E.D. Mich. 1971) ("the record
reflects that [claimant's] interests were fully represented").
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prejudice,"8 the clear weight of authority requires a specific indication
of how the particular claimant was harmed by being unrepresented.
The claimant must show how the administrative law judge failed to
provide for the development of a complete record and the presentation
of a full and fair hearing.
3. Remands When Claimants Unrepresented at Hearings.-
Circumstances Required to Take Case Out of General Rule
The question of whether a claimant was prejudiced or otherwise dis-
advantaged by lack of representation has been approached by viewing
the original hearing from one or both of two different perspectives:
One focuses on the quality of the two major actors, the administrative
law judge and the claimant, and evaluates whether the judge was bi-
ased or otherwise unfair, or whether the claimant was incompetent; the
second focuses on the hearing itself, and inspects whether the record
was developed and the case presented adequately. 19
Courts remand cases in which the administrative law judge was bi-
ased or unfair, or in which an unrepresented claimant was truly incom-
petent, with just the slightest showing of harm. Thus, a court recently
found that an unrepresented claimant's position was not properly
presented at the hearing because the administrative law judge repeat-
edly addressed a fifty-three year old claimant by his first name.1 20
118. Thus, in Goforth v. Cohen, 290 F. Supp. 590, 592 (D.S.C. 1968), the court, without con-
sidering the evidence that might be presented on remand, found that because the claimant had
retained counsel, "remand is necessary in order to allow him to render his services." Similarly,
the court in Clemmons v. Weinberger, 416 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D. Mo. 1976), did not review any
evidence in the record since "[ilt is apparent from the record that [the claimant's] lack of represen-
tation inhibited presentation of her claim and prejudiced her case." Cf. Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d
1179, 1180 (6th Cir. 1970) (McCree, J., dissenting) ("It would be an unusual case which could not
be buttressed by additional testimony, the absence of which is indicated by an adverse decision.").
119. The cases discussed in this section involve the issue of whether a remand is required.
Courts look to a lack of representation, coupled with essentially the same additional circumstances
outlined below, for refusing to apply administrative res judicata, Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d
224, 228 (3d Cir. 1975); Staskel v. Gardner, 274 F. Supp. 861, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1967), and for height-
ening the level of care with which the courts themselves review the record. See Cullison v.
Califano, 613 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1980); Brittinghamn v. Weinberger, 408 F. Supp. 606, 611 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
Unless indicated otherwise, the cases in this section involve instances in which the claimant was
unrepresented at the original hearings.
120. Fabozzi v. Secretary of HEW, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP.
(CCH) 16992 (E.D.N.Y.). The entire substantive portion of Judge Weinstein's Order was as
follows:
mhe Court notes and brings to the attention of the appropriate authorities that the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge ("AL") herein repeatedly referred to the [claimant] as
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Other cases have noted a lack of "solicitousness" on the part of the
administrative law judge, a judge's excessive concern with facts not
helpful to the claimant, the "biased manner" of the hearing, and the
"cursory" nature of a hearing conducted by an administrative law
judge and the judge's determination of the merits of the claim.12 1 A
decision to remand based on incompetence of the claimant is usually
founded on limited education, the existence of a mental condition, or
both; in these cases courts usually find that as a result the claimant was
unable to understand the proceedings or present evidence effectively.1
22
"Saverio", the first name of [the claimant], in addressing him. The Court believes this to
be inappropriate for at least two reasons: first, it treats this 53 [year] old [claimant] in a
condescending manner, and second, it misleads the [claimant] into believing that the
ALJ is [claimant's] friend. The ALJ is an impartial adjudicator ....
Id.
Judge Weinstein ordered further that the case be assigned to a different administrative law
judge on remand. Id.
121. See Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1972) (court noted adminis-
trative law judge's particular concern in his questioning about facts not helpful to the claimant);
Melendez v. Secretary of HEW, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL INS. REP. (CCH)
16884 (E.D.N.Y.) (39 minute hearing with decision filed two days later "was cursory and fell far
short of the legal requirements that the record be fully and fairly developed when a claimant is not
represented by counsel"); Diaz v. Secretary of HEW, 372 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D.P.R. 1973) ("This
Court expects a certain degree of solicitousness from the hearing examiner when a claimant is not
aided by counsel"); Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D. Hawaii 1969) (extensive evidence
of "the biased manner in which the hearing was held"). Cf. Hunley v. Cohen, 288 F. Supp. 537,
541 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (no bias shown despite the fact that "the Examiner may have tried overly
hard to bring out [expert] testimony in a certain way," since "the Examiner also brought out
adverse testimony [relative to the government's case] concerning the difficulty [the claimant] might
have in obtaining employment"); Rauch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6-7 (E.D. Wis. 1967) (admin-
istrative law judge did not create a hostile atmosphere by warning the claimant of the conse-
quences of perjury). See generally Floyd v. Finch, 441 F.2d 73, 77, 90-99 (6th Cir. 1971)
(McAllister, J., dissenting). See also Copley v. Richardson, 475 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1973) (the
administrative law judge should not "employ expert questioning to write a record exclusively
favorable to the government's side of the case"); Mickelson v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer
Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 117015 (D. Minn.) (the administrative law judge "is not the
Secretary's advocate").
An administrative law judge can be requested to withdraw from a case. 45 Fed. Reg. 52085
(1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.940). Failure to do so may be a waiver of objections to
the judge's conduct. See Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 976 (1971).
122. See, e.g., Cullison v. Califano, 613 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1980) (should take "special ac-
count" of mental or emotional disability "which can effectively disable a claimant from substanti-
ating her claim"); Currier v. Secretary of HEW, 612 F.2d 594, 598 (1st Cir. 1980) (administrative
law judge could not rely on the "skimpy evidence ... presented by the uncounselled and men-
tally impaired [claimant]"); Michel v. Califano, 480 F. Supp. 195, 198 (M.D. La. 1979) (limited
education, medical evidence was presented "piecemeal"); Pinkowski v. Califano, 472 F. Supp.
318, 321 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (limited education, "showed difficulty comprehending what was ex-
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Courts also look to claimants' mental condition and education in terms
of their ability to understand the need for representation, 23 and some
have suggested that claimants with mental conditions be represented on
remand. 124
The cases that involve the adequacy of representation in the hearing
process are more complex. Given the general rule that lack of repre-
sentation is not, by itself, a ground for remand and the various indefi-
nite standards that have been presented for judging whether a
claimant, despite a lack of representation, was afforded a full and fair
hearing, courts have found it necessary to look to the specific circum-
stances of the hearing to determine whether a remand for further pro-
ceedings would be appropriate. Although some have attempted to list
those circumstances that warrant a remand, 25 no comprehensive list
can be developed by categorizing according to the specific circum-
stances involved. First, the list would be too broad because individual
judges vary considerably in evaluating the importance of particular cir-
pected of her"); Berry v. Califano, 471 F. Supp. 446, 448 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (limited education,
"highly questionable whether the claimant was able to adequately present his case pro se"); Me-
dina v. Secretary of HEW, 372 F. Supp. 465, 468 (D.P.R. 1973) (limited education, unable to
understand the "technicalities" of the proceedings); Alamo v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 314, 317
(D.P.R. 1972) (mental condition, hearing "too technical for him to fully understand").
Other courts have looked more directly at the result of claimant's effort. See, e.g., Webb v.
Finch, 431 F.2d 1179, 1180 (6th Cir. 1970) (claimant "sought, with obvious ineffectiveness, to
represent himself without the aid of counsel and hampered by lack of education"); Hennig v.
Gardner, 276 F. Supp. 622, 625 (N.D. Tex. 1967) ("The record amply reflects [the claimant's]
inability to present both herself and her cause."). See also Guevarez v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec.
Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) 17027 (S.D.N.Y.), in which the court noted that
claimant's opportunity to respond to a post hearing report was "somewhat artificial in view of the
fact that the claimant was both illiterate and without counsel." Id. at 2499-138.
123. See Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1978) (claimant with mental
condition "did not understand the role that a lawyer would play"); Brandt v. Califano, 470 F.
Supp. 795, 798 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (claimant with limited education was ignorant of the consequence
of her failure to appear at the hearing). See also Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F. Supp. 609, 614 (D.
Hawaii 1969) (administrative law judge criticized for discouraging wife of claimant with only first
grade education from representing him).
124. See, eg., Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Medina v. Secretary of
HEW, 372 F. Supp. 465, 469 (D.P.R. 1973); Roman v. Secretary of HEW, 355 F. Supp. 646, 650
(D.P.R. 1972). Cf. Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D. Md. 1976) (claimant not "so emo-
tionally handicapped and so 'out of it' that sheperse is entitled to be provided with counsel free of
charge to her, and who, without such representation, is unable to receive a fair hearing").
125. See, eg., Parker v. Califano, 441 F. Supp. 1174, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Tillman v. Wein-
berger, 398 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (N.D. Ind. 1975). The listing in Parker includes 10 factors consid-
ered relevant, with the representation of the claimant, and the quality of such representation, if
any, as two of the 10 factors.
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cumstances.' 26 Second, although some cases point to only one specific
circumstance as a basis for remand, most include two or more circum-
stances which indicated that a full and fair hearing was not provided.
Even when only one circumstance is relied on, there is often a finding
of seriousness that aggravates the specific circumstance without which
that one circumstance might not be sufficient. 27 Finally, because of
the highly individual nature of the judges and the hearings under re-
view, the list would be forever incomplete.
A meaningful analysis of the cases ordering remands in which claim-
ants were unrepresented can be made by examining their one, clear
common denominator: In each case the administrative law judge failed
to fullfill at least one aspect of the role expected of administrative law
judges in non-adversary disability hearings. Cases are remanded if the
administrative law judge did not develop a complete record or did not
assure the full and fair presentation of the claim. For purposes of this
analysis the development and presentation responsibilities of the ad-
ministrative law judge each can be subdivided into two categories.
Thus, the cases discussed below are divided into four groups, each re-
flecting a responsibility that someone must fulfill to assure that an un-
represented claimant receives a full and fair hearing: the development
and compilation of documentary evidence, the development of a list of
witnesses, the presentation of bases of disability according to applicable
law, and the presentation of live testimony by witnesses, including the
claimant.
The development and presentation aspects of the process do not rep-
resent separate and distinct steps in any chronological sense. The de-
126. See J. MAsHAw, et al., supra note 3, at 133:
[Jiudges vary widely in their application of the good cause standard.. . . [R]emands
are sometimes granted on the basis of new evidence alone, sometimes on the basis of new
evidence plus lack of counsel, and sometimes on the basis of lack of counsel plus new
evidence plus other indication of prejudice.
127. Thus, in Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 627 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court remanded
a case in which the claimant was unrepresented, citing a number of "errors" by the administrative
law judge. In a concurring opinion, Judge Tamm remarked, "I do not read the opinion of the
court as holding that each of the errors cited, if taken alone, would have been a sufficient ground
for remand." Id. at 284 (Tamm, J., concurring). Judge Tamm also added, however, that "[gliven
a set of facts that would present a single one of these mistakes in stark relief, we very well might
conclude that it alone is enough to justify a remand." Id. (Tamm, J., concurring). In Landess v.
Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1974), the court pointed to the single fact that the unrepre-
sented claimant's treating physician submitted incomplete records, but also remarked that an at-
tempt to determine a disability without a complete report of someone who had examined the
claimant "is medical sophistry at its best." Id. at 1190.
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velopment aspects do tend to occur before the hearing; a list of
witnesses is prepared and most of the documentary evidence is com-
piled before the hearing takes place. The presentation aspects occur
either at the hearing, in the case of questioning witnesses, or near the
hearing. When presenting the legal theories of disability, however, the
task of developing a complete record cannot be concluded until the
case is fully presented. Thus, one cannot know whether all relevant
evidence has been presented, and all relevant witnesses called and fully
questioned until one knows the claimant's legal bases of disability.' 28
Because the major development effort occurs before the case can be
prepared for presentation, the development aspects are considered first.
Although failure to develop a record and present witnesses relates di-
rectly to a co-existing incomplete presentation of the legal claim, most
of the circumstances discussed below concerning development and
presentation of witnesses justify a remand independent of an incom-
plete presentation of the legal claim. On the other hand, most cases
with an incomplete presentation of the legal claim also require a re-
mand for the development and presentation of further evidence. 29
a. Development-Compilation of Documentary Evidence
In disability cases, most documentary evidence, and virtually all such
evidence that is in dispute, relates to the claimant's medical condi-
tion.130 Therefore, although some cases on remand refer to missing
128. Thus, the court may well state, as it did in Heinitz v. Califano, 428 F. Supp. 940, 950
(W.D. Mo. 1977), that an administrative law judge "is under a duty to elicit and gather such
evidence, if it exists, as will enable him to resolve the material factual issues." The question
remains, what are the material factual issues?
129. Of course, a record possibly will contain any evidence necessary to resolve a legal basis of
disability that had not been presented at the hearing. In some instances, courts will grant or deny
benefits without remanding for further consideration by the administrative law judge. See, e.g.,
Rayborn v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (N.D. Ind. 1975), in which court awarded bene-
fits on the basis of a mental condition ignored by the administrative law judge, finding "abundant
evidence" in the record on that issue, even though had the claimant been represented it would be
"very reasonable to believe that a fairer record would have been made." More often, however, a
remand is ordered, if only for the administrative law judge to reconsider the evidence already in
the record. See, eg., Sharpe v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (E.D. Va. 1977) (although the
evidence was in the record, case was remanded because the administrative law judge "made no
apparent effort to evaluate the evidence of [the claimant's] alcohol abuse in light of the [applica-
ble] regulations."). Rosa v. Weinberger, 381 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (case re-
manded when the record included both objective and subjective medical evidence but the
administrative law judge failed to consider the subjective evidence).
130. See generally J. MAsHAw, et al., supra note 3, at 49-64.
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nonmedical documentary evidence,1 3 1 the question of the effect of
missing documentary evidence on a request for remand by a previously
unrepresented claimant can be examined in detail only with respect to
medical evidence. 32
Some courts simply apply a general rule on development that admin-
istrative law judges must assure the inclusion of all relevant facts into
the record, and remand whenever additional medical evidence exists
which might have produced a favorable decision for the claimant. 33
Most courts realize, however, that administrative law judges cannot
"search out all the relevant evidence which might be available,"' 34 and
require an additional showing beyond the existence of an incomplete
medical record. This showing, which distinguishes "run of the mill
cases" in which a special responsibility does not exist,1 35 amounts to a
131. See, ag., Brandt v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 795, 797-98 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (case remanded
to consider additional evidence, including reports from state vocational rehabilitation department
concerning claimant's vocational capacity); Warmijak v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 441, 444 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (absence of vocational report or other vocational evidence).
132. Remand is the only relief available in these cases because the courts cannot consider new
evidence relative to the merits of the claim. See Parks v. Harris, 614 F.2d 83, 84-85 (5th Cir.
1980).
133. A broad application of the general rule is found in Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1179, 1180
(6th Cir. 1970), a 2-1 decision in which the majority deemed "representations made to the Court
by [claimant's] counsel that there is additional evidence [of the disability] which might produce a
different result," coupled with the fact that the claimant, assisted at the hearing only by a friend,
"sought, with obvious ineffectiveness, to represent himself," a sufficient basis for remand. Cf. id.
(McCree, J., dissenting) ("It would be an unusual case which could not be buttressed by additional
testimony, the absence of which is indicated by an adverse decision."). The Fourth Circuit ex-
pressed a similar idea recently in Cullison v. Califano, 613 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1980), indicating a
remand may be proper when new evidence is presented that "might reasonably" lead to a different
decision. See also Hamm v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 328, 331 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (citing an "in-
conclusive" medical record that "leaves much to be desired in terms of objective medical find-
ings").
Often it is unclear whether the additional evidence was available at the time of the hearing. See
Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 8, 9-10 (D. Md. 1976) (additional evidence "was either not avail-
able, or, whether or not it was available, was not presented to" the administrative law judge). But
see Torres v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.P.R. 1971) (remand based on the
existence of additional medical evidence "which was available but was not produced at the hear-
ing"). Presumably these are the types of cases that will receive greater scrutiny in light of the 1980
amendments before remands are ordered. See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra. In Torres,
however, the amendments might not have made a difference because the court noted that the
claimant was unrepresented and indicated that the evidence was available because it was used in a
damages case arising out of the same accident that produced the alleged disability. Id. at 1332.
See text accompanying note 139 Mnfra.
134. Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974).
135. See Currier v. Secretary of HEW, 612 F.2d 594, 598 (1st Cir. 1980), in which the court,
after listing reasons why the administrative law judge should have compiled a record to include
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finding that the development responsibilities of the administrative law
judge were not fulfilled.
One set of cases concerns incomplete development caused by the
simple carelessness or incompetence of the administrative law judge.
Thus, courts have remanded cases when the records are illegible, 13 6
when relevant reports are excluded from the record on the basis of a
careless misreading,'37 and when reports in the record fail to indicate
whether an opinion is based on a personal examination. 38  Similarly,
courts have remanded cases in which the administrative law judge
could have completed the record without much difficulty, 139 and have
noted occasionally that the judge could have met the responsibility by
merely identifying the deficiency and asking the claimant to supply the
additional evidence.1 4
0
Another set of cases involves situations in which the administrative
law judge fails to compile an adequate documentary record even
though information is already in the file which indicates a need for
further evidence. The indication of need can be general,' 4 1 but more
often there is a specific basis for determining that the judge should have
reports from doctors, social workers, and other "key witnesses," "emphasize[d] that we do not see
such responsibilities arising in run of the mill cases."
136. See, e.g., Cutler v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1285 (2d Cir. 1975) (claimant represented
by nonattorney; medical records illegible "because of the poor quality of the reproduction, the
handwriting of the physician, or both"); Rosado v. Richardson, 372 F. Supp. 469, 470-71 (D.P.R.
1973) (medical records "hard to read, and we question whether the Secretary might not have been
able to secure more legible copies"); Machen v. Gardner, 319 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (E.D. Tenn.
1968) (handwritten reports "a classic example of the illegible handwriting of medical doctors").
137. Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 627 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (assumed disability re-
ports from insurance company were vouchers, without examining them).
138. Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. See, eg., Currier v. Secretary of HEW, 612 F.2d 594, 598 (lst Cir. 1980) ("within the
power of the administrative law judge, without undue effort, to see that the gaps [in the medical
record] are somewhat filled--as by ordering easily obtained further or more complete [medical]
reports"); Crowder v. Gardner, 249 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D.S.C. 1966) ("it appears that. . . a bit
more development will probably enable [the claimant] to satisfactorily carry his burden of
proof").
140. Thus, in Steimer v. Gardner, 395 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1968), the court affirmed the
decision of the administrative law judge who had "more than once indicated to [the claimant] that
more information, specially from [the treating physician], would be helpful." Cf. Erwin v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 312 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D.N.J. 1970) (remand ordered despite the fact that the
administrative law judge "did his utmost to assist [claimant], particularly in the matter of ob-
taining all relevant [medical] information."). See also Warmijak v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 441,
444 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("incumbent upon the Secretary at least to advise the claimant that he should
amplify the medical evidence").
141. See, eg., Prewitt v. Celebreeze, 330 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1964) (in light of claimant's
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realized the need to develop further medical evidence. Thus, courts
have remanded cases in which evidence in the record points to obvious
sources for additional relevant information, such as full reports from
the claimant's physician and records from hospitals where the claimant
had been a patient. 42 Similarly, the absence of supplemental medical
evidence necessary to update existing evidence or suggested in an ex-
isting report has led to a remand. 143
Finally, courts have remanded cases for compilation of further medi-
cal evidence when the record indicates that such evidence should be
developed in order to resolve a particular issue involved in the claim.
One example is when the evidence in the record fails to cover the pe-
riod before the claimant's special insured status lapsed, 1" which is an
issue that should be obvious to the administrative law judge. Other
particular issues insufficiently covered by the medical record that have
warranted a remand include the existence of specific disabling condi-
tions, 45 or the existence of specific evidence necessary to prove a dis-
"obvious inability to pursue his normal work," case should not be decided on the basis of a medi-
cal record deemed "meager" and "not extensive").
142. See Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1980) (no reports in the record from
the claimant's treating physician); Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1974)
(same). In Thorne v. Califano, 607 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1979), the court remanded for further evi-
dence, including a more complete report from the claimant's treating physician, although the
claimant was represented by an attorney at the hearing. The court remarked, "without intending
criticism of claimant's counsel, we felt counsel should have been prepared to submit [more com-
plete] reports from treating physicians." Id. at 219 n.3. See also Heinitz v. Califano, 428 F. Supp.
940, 950 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (necessary additional evidence might have come "from the same physi-
cians who have rendered the abbreviated medical reports which are currently in the. . . record").
Relevant hospital records were missing in Flores v. Department of HEW, 465 F. Supp. 317, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), despite the claimant's statement to the Social Security Administration that he
had been treated at a particular hospital and had told the administrative law judge that he was
under medication from doctors at the hospital. Hospital records were also incomplete in
Guevarez v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1 17027
(S.D.N.Y.), in which patient records had not been requested because of the administrative law
judge's "gratuitous assumption" that the claimant had been treated only as an out-patient.
143. See Frappier v. Secretary of HEW, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP.
(CCH) 117039 (D. Minn.) (failure to order test recommended in report already in file); Bachels v.
Califano, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 116382 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (need for
more current medical evidence).
144. See, eg., Johnson v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 1023, 1025 (8th Cir. 1973); Rosado v. Richard-
son, 372 F. Supp. 469, 471 (D.P.R. 1973). See also text accompanying note 157 infra.
145. See, e g., Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1188-89 (8th Cir. 1974) (record failed to
cover complaints of arthritis); Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D. Md. 1976) (additional
records from mental hospital necessary when mental condition not discussed at hearing). See also
text accompanying notes 155-57 infra.
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abling condition. 146 These cases, particularly those involving more
subtle or hidden issues, relate to the cases discussed below concerning
the presentation of the claimant's legal case. 47
b. Development-Calling Witnesses
The claimant is the primary witness in any disability hearing, and
therefore no effort is required to produce the primary witness. 43
Courts remand cases, however, when other relevant witnesses are not
called. Thus, records have been found to be incomplete when witnesses
who could testify concerning a claimant's medical condition or unsuc-
cessful attempts to work at a former job were not called, 149 and when
the administrative law judge discouraged the presentation of witnesses
brought by the claimant to the hearing to testify on her behalf.50
Many missing witness cases involve vocational experts. Typically,
the administrative law judge finds without expert testimony that the
claimant cannot perform any relevant former work but can perform
other suitable work. In these cases, many courts require expert testi-
mony in order to find against the claimant, particularly when the
claimant is unrepresented.' 5 ' Although a remand order temporarily
146. See, e.g., Veal v. Califano, 610 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir. 1979) (insufficient medical evi-
dence to meet legal standard for disability on the basis of alcoholism); Miranda v. Secretary of
HEW, 514 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (1st Cir. 1975) (inadequate record on claimant's pain as proof of
disability). See also text accompanying notes 159-60 infra.
147. See text accompanying notes 153-60 infra.
148. Of course, the claimant does not have to appear. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52086 (1980) (to be
codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(b)). An issue may arise concerning the effectiveness of this waiver
when the claimant was unrepresented. See Skenandore v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (waiver of right to appear and present evidence at hearing "indicates [the claimant] did
not know how to best appeal the denial of benefits").
149. See Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1972) (administrative law
judge should have called witnesses regarding claimant's medical condition when judge considered
case unpersuasive); Fessler v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (judge should have
called former employer who could have testified easily in person or by affidavit because it was a
local business). C. Cutler v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1286 (2d Cir. 1975) ("it was incumbent
upon the administrative law judge to emphasize the desirability of producing, and to afford an
opportunity to produce expert [vocational and medical] testimony"). See also Stewart v. Cohen,
309 F. Supp. 949, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (administrative law judge had duty to call "material wit-
nesses of whom he knew," such as the claimant's vocational counselor).
150. See Clemmons v. Weinberger, 416 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (claimant told
"witnesses normally aren't all that meaningful in this type of case"). q. Guzman v. Califano, 480
F. Supp. 735, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court declined to fault judge for not calling claimant's daugh-
ter to corroborate claimant's testimony since "[t]he AiU told [the claimant] . . . that she could
introduce evidence. How much further must (or should) the hearing officer go?").
151. The Eighth Circuit has clearly stated the expert testimony requirement. See Willem v.
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removes a decision unfavorable to the claimant, the failure to produce
a vocational expert relates to the administrative law judge's responsibil-
ity to assure that the record is also complete relative to the govern-
ment's case. 152
c. Presentation-Legal Bases of Disability
Because substantive Social Security disability law is complex and
vague, it is a difficult and often subjective task to evaluate whether a
claimant's legal bases of disability had been presented properly. Nev-
ertheless, courts examine whether an administrative law judge assured
the proper presentation of a claimant's case. This is one area, however,
in which general rules have little meaning. What does it mean, for ex-
ample, to state that "all arguable bases" of disability must be explored,
or only "likely possibilities" need be examined fully? Although some
courts attempt to establish guidelines, 153 the courts in most cases inves-
tigate the existing record of the hearing and decide whether the claim
was properly presented. Thus, although a few cases note the closeness
or difficulty of the issues, 15 4 courts generally are concerned with
whether a particular disability was not presented that should have been
considered, or whether a particular disability that was presented was
presented fully.
Richardson, 490 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (8th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 1023, 1025
(8th Cir. 1973); Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir. 1972). Cf. Hall v. Secretary of
HEW, 602 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979) (although vocational expert not required, facts must be
developed diligently when claimant unrepresented). See also Sexton v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec.
Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 116885 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Terry v. Mathews, 427 F.
Supp. 464, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (remand because witness was psychologist without qualifications to
be a vocational expert).
152. A vocational expert is considered a neutral witness. A vocational expert is used, however,
to meet the government's burden after the claimant has shown an inability to engage in vocation-
ally relevant past work. See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra. Cf. Borrero Arce v. Finch, 307
F. Supp. 1071, 1074-75 (D.P.R. 1969) (court rejected the claimant's argument that calling a voca-
tional expert to help prove the government's case was an indication of the administrative law
judge's lack of impartiality).
153. Compare Brittingham v. Weinberger, 408 F. Supp. 606, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("While [the
duty to insure a fair and thorough hearing] requires the administrative law judge to maintain his
or her objectivity, it also suggests an obligation. . . to assist an unrepresented claimant by ex-
plaining... the way in which evidence of the claimant's disability might best be presented.")
with Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D. Md. 1976) (administrative law judge need not
explore every basis, but should develop the "strength of a [claimant's] contentions").
154. See, e.g., Pinkowski v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 318, 321 (E.D. Wis. 1979) ("case was a
difficult one to present"); Erwin v. Secretary of HEW, 312 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D.N.J. 1970) ("In a
close case of this kind [being unrepresented] placed [the claimant] at a disadvantage.").
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A large number of cases involve the failure of an administrative law
judge to inquire into a psychological basis for disability. In some of
these cases the courts find that the existence of a mental condition is
"obvious" or "undisputed" from the existing record. 55 In most of the
others, the courts can point to at least some indication that the adminis-
trative law judge should have known that further inquiry was re-
quired.'56 Remands also result from the failure of administrative law
judges to explore apparent physical impairments as potential bases of
disability. In these cases, courts also analyze the record before the ad-
ministrative law judge for an indication of the possible existence of an
unexplored impairment. When the existence of an unexplored physical
impairment is indicated in the record, courts have ordered a remand
because it appeared the impairment might meet the requirements of
one or more of the disabilities listed in the federal regulations, or, even
though the evidence did not seem to show that the requirements of a
particular listed impairment could be met, it appeared that further de-
velopment might enable the claimant to establish disability because of
the cumulative effect of a number of impairments.157
155. See Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1978) ("record. . . replete
with undisputed evidence of the [claimant's] mental as well as physical breakdown"); Medina v.
Secretary of HEW, 372 F. Supp. 465, 467-68 (D.P.R. 1973) ("obvious" mental condition should
have been explored); Alamo v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 314, 317 (D.P.R. 1972) ("when a claim-
ant appears without counsel at the administrative hearing and the presence of a mental impair-
ment is obvious,. . . it is the duty of the hearing examiner to adequately explore all aspects of the
claim before him").
156. See, e.g., Strayhorn v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("several indi-
cations in the record that [the claimant's] complaints of pain and stiffness were primarily psycho-
somatic in origin"); Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 8, 9-10 (D. Md. 1976) (evidence of mental
problem in record "not by any means weak"); de Leon v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 905,
907 (D.P.R. 1972) (consulting neurologist recommended psychiatric examination). In Garcia v.
Califano, 625 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1980), the court refused to remand a case for further psy-
chological evidence because administrative law judges "need not inquire into matters apparently
unrelated to the claim," without reconciling that statement with the fact that a report indicating
the claimant's depression was in the record. Id. at 355. Cf. Bishop v. Weinberger, 380 F. Supp.
293, 297 (E.D. Va. 1974) (no evidence of a mental impairment was introduced into the record at
the hearing, and the court found no error in the administrative law judge's failure to inquire into
the issue; nonetheless, the court ordered a remand, noting "not the least of [the court's] concern is
the fact ... that the [claimant] was not represented").
157. See, e.g., Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 627 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (failure to
explore evidence of cumulative effect); Livingston v. Califano, 614 F.2d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 1980)
(failure to inquire further into the listed requirements for active rheumatoid arthritis, despite
"clear signs" in the existing record that the claimant had the disease; court noted that the adminis-
trative law judge "failed to inquire properly into the claimant's strongest argument and yet did
inquire about arguably irrelevant matters"); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407-08 (3d
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A second group of cases involving the presentation of the legal bases
of disability explore whether a particular disability that was presented
at the hearing was presented fully and properly. Thus, a common basis
for remand exists when a claimant, whose special insured status ended
prior to the hearing, presents evidence only on the issue of current disa-
bility and the administrative law judge fails to develop evidence that
could link the disability to the earlier, relevant period of time.15 8 Simi-
larly, courts have remanded cases when administrative law judges fail
to obtain, or discourage the presentation of, competent and relevant
general proof of disability, 59 or proof specifically required to establish
Cir. 1979) (failure to examine further into claimant's ischemic heart disease, a listed impairment;
the court noted that "[a]rguably, the [administrative law judge] should have pursued this possibil-
ity by calling for additional evidence, and if counsel had represented [the claimant] this possibility
undoubtedly would have been pursued"); Heinitz v. Califano, 429 F. Supp. 940, 949 (W.D. Mo.
1977) (failure to explore a number of specific listed impairments and evidence of their cumulative
effect on claimant's ability to work). See also Lupinacci v. Mathews, 433 F. Supp. 47, 49-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the court remanded because the administrative law judge failed to
explore the ultimate disabling effects of the claimant's serum hepatitis, when the existence of the
hepatitis was clearly insufficient to establish disability. In Figueroa v. Secretary of HEW, 585
F.2d 551, 553-54 (ist Cir. 1978), the court remanded for further development of a claim based on
the side effects of prescribed medication despite a finding that existing evidence on the issue was
"not strong," stating that "[it would have been appropriate for the administrative law judge to
have sought further medical evidence, or to have made some further inquiry, since [the claimant]
raised the question." Id. at 554.
158. See, e.g., Thorne v. Califano, 607 F.2d 218, 219-20 (8th Cir. 1979) (failure to develop
evidence relating to period prior to termination of special insured status); Sellars v. Secretary of
HEW. 458 F.2d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 1972) (the administrative law judge "did not give the claimant
an opportunity to describe her condition during the critical period of time. His inquiry of her was
limited to her present condition only"); Saldana v. Weinberger, 421 F. Supp. 1127, 1131-32 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (failure to make claimant aware of the significance of the dates of special insured status).
In Sellars the court noted that "[i]t should be a simple process for the claimant, who is now
represented by competent counsel, to fully develop medical opinion as to whether or not she was
actually disabled during the critical period". 458 F.2d at 986. In Thorne the claimant was repre-
sented; the court noted, "without intending criticism," that the claimant's counsel should have
submitted evidence on this point. 607 F.2d at 219 n.3.
159. Thus, courts have remanded cases in which administrative law judges fail to obtain sub-
jective evidence of pain or blindness. See, e.g., Valle v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder]
UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 116683 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (administrative law judge failed to develop
full record on effect of pain on claimant); Skenandore v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) ("the fact that [the claimant] did not know he could present subjective evidence of his
symptoms was crucial in his case"); Clemmons v. Weinberger, 416 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D. Mo.
1976) (failure to seek subjective evidence of pain when seated); Dunn v. Richardson, 325 F. Supp.
337, 345 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (because the administrative law judge considered only objective medi-
cal evidence to be relevant, the claimant and her witness were "given no opportunity by the exam-
iner to testify in respect to the nature and severity of her blindness"). In Clemmons v.
Weinberger, 416 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D. Mo. 1976), the administrative law judge was criticized
for failing to inquire into the claimant's ability to get to and from a job, a "factor. . .significant
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a particular disability. 160
d. Presentation--Questioning of Witnesses
The questioning of witnesses involves an aspect of administrative
law judges' presentation role different from that discussed immediately
above, as well as an aspect of their development role different from that
considered with respect to the compilation of a list of witnesses. The
issue is whether a witness, who attended the hearing and testified to one
or more presumably relevant matters, was questioned fully and prop-
erly. The cases can be divided into two categories: first, those involv-
ing the questioning of vocational experts, usually called to establish
that some suitable employment is available to the claimant despite a
demonstrated inability to engage in any former occupations; and sec-
ond, those involving the questioning of the claimant. 16 1  Although
other witnesses, typically friends and relatives of the claimant, are fre-
quently called to testify to the apparent effects of the claimant's disabil-
ity, virtually all problems with questioning of witnesses involve
vocational experts and claimants, possibly because other witnesses' tes-
timony is relatively simple and direct.' 62
to a determination of her ability to engage in gainful employment on a regular or sustained basis."
See also Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the court
noted that evidence of an earlier finding of disability under state law had not been introduced into
the record. Although this determination would not be conclusive relative to a finding of a disabil-
ity under the Social Security Act, the court added that "even minimal advocacy" would suggest
arguing that the two decisions should be consistent. Id. at 862.
160. To some extent this is the same failure as noted above with respect to listed impairments.
See note 157 supra. Other examples are cases involving proof of alcoholism as a basis of disabil-
ity. Case law requires evidence of certain effects on the claimant, and courts have remanded cases
when the administrative law judge fails to inquire into those particulars. Thus, in Veal v.
Califano, 610 F.2d 495, 497 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979), the court concluded that "the AL's questioning of
[the claimant] regarding his alcohol problem was totally inadequate. He asked only three brief
questions concerning [the claimant's] drinking habits. The questions did not relate in any way to
his ability to voluntarily control his drinking, and [the claimant's] responses were not developed."
See also King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Clary v. Harris, [1980 Soc. Sec.
Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 117057 (D.D.C.).
161. The problem of how to question a vocational expert and other witnesses besides the
claimant arises, of course, only after the administrative law judge has assessed the need for and
has chosen to call the witness. See text accompanying notes 149-52 supra.
162. Some cases involve generally incomplete questioning that can include other witnesses as
well as the claimant. See, e.g., Rosa v. Weinberger, 381 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), in
which the court found that the administrative law judge's questions to the claimant and her
daughter "were cursory and rarely were the necessary follow-up questions asked." See also Till-
man v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 1124, 1128-29 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (failure to ask follow-up ques-
tions of claimant and her two daughters after ineffective questioning by claimant's representative).
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The key to the examination of a vocational expert in disability cases
is the presentation of complete hypothetical questions that allow the
expert to express an opinion as to whether the claimant, given the facts
assumed in the hypothetical question, can engage in a particular, avail-
able occupation. Additionally, the expert should give examples of the
occupations.' 63 Thus, courts have remanded cases when a finding of
nondisability was based on the opinion of a vocational expert in re-
sponse to a hypothetical question by an administrative law judge in
which important facts from the record were omitted or the facts in-
cluded in the question were erroneous or incomplete.'" A remand is
the only option in these cases because the reviewing court does not
have the expertise to evaluate the claimant's capacity despite the pres-
ence of all relevant evidence. 65 Courts also expect the administrative
law judge to cross-examine the vocational expert. Thus, cases have
163. See generally text accompanying notes 39-41 supra. The questioning of vocational ex-
perts remains important despite the use of the new vocational guidelines. See Gilliam v. Califano,
620 F.2d 691,694 (8th Cir. 1980). The vocational expert is not to interpret the medical evidence or
offer an opinion on the ultimate issue of the claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful
activity. Garcia v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEmPL_ INS. REP. (CCH) 117011
(E.D. Pa.).
164. See, eg., Brenem v. Califano, 621 F.2d 688, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1980) (failure to include
evidence of psychological impairments); McGill v. Harris, 615 F.2d 365, 367 (5th Cir. 1980) (fail-
ure to include claimant's age, education and work experience); Lewis v. Califano, 574 F.2d 452,
456 (8th Cir. 1978) (question assumed claimant could stop drinking despite evidence of chronic
alcoholism); Daniels v. Mathews, 567 F.2d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 1977) (question included vague and
incomplete reference to mental condition); Febo Agosto v. Secretary of HEW, 440 F. Supp. 251,
254 (D.P.R. 1977) (failure to include reference to evidence of mental deficiencies); Kelley v. Wein-
berger, 391 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (failure to include subjective evidence of pain
and numbness, or claimant's age, education, and employment history). Cf. Fulks v. Califano,
[1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 16638 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (court re-
manded because administrative law judge failed to include subjective evidence of pain in the
hypothetical question, without making a specific finding as to why that evidence was not be-
lieved). See also Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 627 F.2d 278, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (claimant's need
to nap and difficulties in travelling omitted; evidence of physical impairment and pain described
incompletely).
165. Cf. Mickelson v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. 17015
(D. Minn.) (court awarded benefits after finding that vocational expert had been questioned with-
out regard to all relevant facts because record as a whole "conclusively" established claimant's
disability). Compare Stewart v. Cohen, 309 F. Supp. 949, 956-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (court rejected
an argument that a remand was not required because the entire record was available to the voca-
tional expert when the administrative law judge asked a hypothetical question that omitted facts
favorable to the claimant) with DeSousa v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL.
INS. REP. (CCH) 116962 (D.D.C.) (court refused to remand despite use of a hypothetical question
that omitted reference to claimant's alleged pain because the vocational expert was found to have
heard all of the testimony at the hearing and was subject to cross-examination by the claimant's
attorney).
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been remanded when no effort was made to seek an explanation of the
expert's conclusions, when follow-up questioning was incomplete, and
when the administrative law judge did not challenge incorrect assump-
tions made by the expert.' 66
The administrative law judges' responsibility in questioning of
claimants is less clear, although courts have remanded when the ques-
tioning was unfairly presented or, even if fairly presented, resulted in
incomplete testimony.' 6 A related factor is the claimant's ability to
present his or her own testimony effectively.1 68 There does not appear
to be any pattern in the cases involving incomplete questioning of
claimants. Courts have remanded because of incomplete questioning
concerning both medical and vocational issues, 69 including vocational
166. See, e.g., Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1980) (no inquiry into types of
jobs claimants could perform with reference to physical and mental impairments); Dobrowosky
v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1979) ("expert was never pressed to explain his conclu-
sions"); Garcia v. Califano, [1980 Soc. Sec. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 117011
(E.D. Pa.) ("the ALJ had a duty to seek some explanation of the expert's conclusions"); Herlache
v. Califano, 478 F. Supp. 848, 849 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (report filed with court showed expert's con-
clusion concerning availability of particular work was incorrect; "had [the claimant] been repre-
sented by counsel at his administrative hearing, his case would have been presented more
effectively"). See also Concepcion v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.P.R. 1971) (the
court criticized the administrative law judge for "leading" the vocational expert away from the
conclusion that an employgr might not risk hiring someone who had been ill). Cf. Peoples v.
Richardson, 468 F.2d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 1972) ("no impropriety in the hearing examiner inquiring
fully into the basis of vocational expert's conclusions relative to employment available to claim-
ant"); Brittingharn v. Weinberger, 408 F. Supp. 606, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court, although remand-
ing the case on other grounds, rejected an argument based on the administrative law judge's
questioning of the vocational expert because the claimant did not "suggest that she was unable to
effectively cross-examine the vocational expert ... without the assistance of counsel or that the
absence of cross-examination was in any way prejudicial").
167. See, e.g., Quies v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 110, 112 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (administrative law
judge admitted that "[c]aimant's testimony was elicited with considerable difficulty, and with lack
of completeness through an interpreter"); Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 372 F. Supp. 399, 401
(D.P.R. 1973) (administrative law judge "limited [the claimant's] testimony at hearing by telling
her to answer exactly what he asked").
168. In Torres v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 1329 (D.P.R. 1971), the court was concerned
about the claimant's incomplete responses even though he sought deliberately to evade the ques-
tions asked of him, finding his "sophmoric attempt to evade" evidence of his inability to present
his case properly. Id. at 1332. Cf. Pelletier v. Secretary of HEW, 525 F.2d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 1975)
(court ordered a remand because claimant, educated at the Museum School of Fine Arts in Bos-
ton, was not questioned fully concerning the conditions at her work as a t~chnical illustrator).
169. See, ag., Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[a]nother defi-
ciency is the very limited probing by the ALJ regarding the physical effort actually required by
[the claimant] in her laundry work"); Copley v. Richardson, 475 F.2d 772, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1973)
(incomplete questioning about claimant's ability to work because administrative law judge asked
about her hourly wages, but not her weekly, monthly, or yearly earnings); Hennig v. Gardner, 276
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matters that were presented to an expert as part of a hypothetical ques-
tion.' 70
D. Satisfying the Minimum Requirements with Representation: An
Incomplete and Sometimes Unnecessary Solution
As has been shown above, courts find that claimants are deprived of
their right to a disability determination based on a complete record and
a full and fair hearing when administrative law judges fail in some re-
spect to perform their development and presentation functions effec-
tively. How should the minimum requirements of the disability
determination process be met? Courts often seem to give up on the
administrative law judge and look to the possibility of representation as
the solution, at least in those cases in which the claimant's case, as op-
posed to the government's case, is not developed or presented properly.
In some instances, the representative's role is seen as virtually indispen-
sable, whether expressed in general terms or limited to the particular
case.' 7 ' Although nothing indicates that representatives will be found
to be indispensable as a matter of law,172 the actual value of representa-
tion must be considered in formulating any proposal to improve the
present non-adversary system.
The true role of representatives in providing claimants a disability
determination based on a complete record and a full and fair hearing is
particularly apparent when administrative law judges fail in the pro-
cess. A review of those significant aspects of the process in which the
F. Supp. 622, 625 (N.D. Tex. 1967) (the claimant "should have been questioned more thoroughly
by the examiner concerning her arthritic condition").
170. See, e.g., Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to ask claimant
about his ability to sustain daily work activity when the ability was assumed in question to voca-
tional expert); Barnett v. Mathews, 418 F. Supp. 710, 711 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (question to vocational
expert assumed that claimant could engage in sedentary work without sufficient evidence in the
record to support that assumption); Torres v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.P.R.
197 1) ("an attorney would have aided [the claimant] in describing more fully his priorjobs so as to
give the expert a more adequate basis on which to make his findings").
171. See, e.g., Herlache v. Califano, 478 F. Supp. 848, 849 (E.D. Wis. 1979) ("had [the claim-
ant] been represented by counsel at his administrative hearing, his case would have been
presented more effectively"); Diaz v. Secretary, 372 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D.P.R. 1973) ("whether the
claimant is or is not assisted by counsel at the administrative hearing. . . can mean the difference
between remaining uncompensated or receiving the requested benefits"). In Robinson v. Cele-
brezze, 248 F. Supp. 149, 150 (W.D.S.C. 1965), the court noted that given the practices of the
administrative law judges in its region, "the unrepresented claimant is beat before he starts." Cf
K. DAVIS, supra note 85 (counsel "useless" and a "needless expense").
172. See note 16 supra.
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administrative law judge cannot, and perhaps should not, assume pri-
mary responsibility for the development or presentation of a claimant's
or the government's case, shows that some representation may be nec-
essary. Because of the remedial and beneficial purposes of the Social
Security program, which themselves substantiate the value of the non-
adversary nature of the existing disability determination process, a
sharing of responsibility among the administrative law judge and the
parties, or, if necessary, the parties' representatives, is the appropriate
and most effective solution to the problem of unrepresented claimants.
A conscious sharing of responsibilities is appropriate because the par-
ties ultimately share the goal of a properly and efficiently administered
program.173 The assumption of some responsibility for the full and fair
administration of the program by some type of representative is neces-
sary and should be welcomed by the corps of administrative law judges
that has been unable to assure the minimum requirements of the disa-
bility determination process on its own.
It is not always clear whether and to what extent a representative or
the administrative law judge should be responsible for developing or
presenting a particular case.' 74 After reviewing the circumstances in
which courts find that administrative law judges have not met their re-
sponsibilities, some situations can be seen as involving essentially neu-
tral functions when the approach to the tasks involved would not be
affected because one was representing the claimant or the government.
Others, however, involve more of an advocacy function, although in a
non-adversary context, when the approach would be colored depend-
ing on the side that one was representing. Although representatives
certainly can perform neutral functions, there is no reason to relieve
prehearing administrators, or, if necessary, administrative law judges
173. This -correspondence of interests distinguishes Social Security disability adjudications
from others because "there are no necessary winners or losers fighting over a fixed sum set aside
for disability purposes." See Verkuil, A Study of InformalAdjudicadon Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 739, 754-55 (1976). Conflict between the class of potential beneficiaries and the trust fund
itself is not involved here. See text accompanying note 17 supra. If improved procedures result in
more awards of benefits than the program can support, the appropriate congressional response
would be to amend the substantive disability requirement. See text accompanying notes 26-28
supra. See generally Bloch, Cooperative Federalism and the Role ofLitigation in the Development of
Federal.AFDC Eligibiity Policy, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1, 27-51.
174. For example, in Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978), the court found that
the administrative law judge did not inquire into certain relevant facts and concluded, without
speculating how it might best be done, that "[h]ad a more thorough inquiry been undertaken,
much time and effort might have been avoided."
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and their staffs, from these responsibilities. On the other hand, the use
of representatives may, to the extent that there is an advocacy function
involved, be necessary and desirable.
The clearest example of an essentially neutral function is the devel-
opment of documentary evidence. Although courts recognize that rep-
resentatives can be useful in compiling a complete record, 175 the
administrative law judge's responsibility in this regard is equally im-
portant. 176 The development function includes asking the claimant to
provide a list of relevant sources, and examining records and reports
for indications that further records and reports are available. Although
the search for sources may be active, it remains neutral in character.
The development function in the calling of witnesses can be seen simi-
larly: sources must be questioned and examined for potential wit-
nesses, but the task of calling them is essentially neutral. By contrast,
the presentation of claimants' legal bases of disability is a fairly obvi-
ous advocacy function, and an area in which representation is espe-
cially helpful.
The remaining aspect of the presentation of the claim, the question-
ing of witnesses, and certain elements of development relative to docu-
mentary evidence and witnesses, are not so easily categorized as either
neutral or advocacy functions. Although certain basic questions can be
asked routinely, the medical or vocational facts are often so complex,
conflicting, or obscure that the questioning of witnesses must be con-
ducted from the separate perspectives of the parties. 7 7 Similarly, al-
175. See, e.g., Cullison v. Califano, 613 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1980) ("The difference in the
evidence presented by claimant and that discovered by counsel is striking."); Storck v. Wein-
berger, 402 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D. Md. 1975) (problems raised concerning incomplete record will
be "obviated" on remand when claimant represented). Popkin found that adding additional doc-
umentary evidence is a key to claimants' success at disability hearings, whether such evidence is
provided by the claimants themselves or their representatives. See Popkin, supra note 1, at 1030-
32.
176. See text accompanying notes 130-47 supra. In both Garrett v. Richardson, 363 F. Supp.
83, 90 (D.S.C. 1973) and Byrd v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 957, 963 (D.S.C. 1973), the court noted
that the administrative law judge had responsibility for developing the documentary evidence,
despite the representation of claimants.
177. See, e.g., Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (additional evi-
dence concerning a listed impairment "undoubtedly would have been pursued" by counsel);
Torres v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.P.R. 1971) ("an attorney would inquire
further into the neuropsychological aspects of the case"). In Torres the court expressed the role of
an attorney relative to the questioning of a vocational expert as follows:
With the aid of an attorney [the claimant] would have been able to interrogate the
vocational expert adequately; the examiner would not have been able to ask an inade-
quate, confusing and incomplete hypothetical question (or at least the defects would
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though certain documents can be compiled and certain witnesses called
almost automatically, other development functions involve an element
of advocacy when the need for the evidence becomes apparent only
after presentation of more difficult and subtle issues.
The distinction between neutral and advocacy functions indicates
when it may be more appropriate to rely on representatives or adminis-
trative law judges to assure the minimum requirements that a disability
decision be based on a complete record and a full and fair hearing. An
analysis of the important development and presentation aspects of the
hearing process is presented in the next section in a proposed system of
shared responsibilities among claimants, representatives, and adminis-
trative law judges. First, however, other suggestions for change in the
non-adversary disability determination process, including the use of a
government representative, are considered.
II. REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY IN NON-ADVERSARY
HEARINGS
Administrative law judges do not perform effectively the three jobs
that their three hats symbolically represent. The cases discussed in the
previous section show that administrative law judges often fail to per-
form adequately throughout the hearing process in the development
and presentation of the claimant's and the government's case. Further-
more these failures, at least when claimants are unrepresented, are seen
as a denial of the claimant's right to a disability determination based on
a complete record and a full and fair hearing, and the cases are re-
manded for further proceedings. Thus, in effect they are remanded for
another try by the administrative law judge to wear whichever of the
three hats was not worn with distinction at the original hearing.'78
The problem is that at least certain responsibilities left to administra-
tive law judges cannot and should not be performed by them. Al-
though there are supporters of the present structure, most support the
have been corrected) .... An attorney would have aided [the claimant] in describing
more fully his prior jobs so as to give the expert a more adequate basis on which to make
his findings.
337 F. Supp. at 1332.
178. One has no more of a right to representation on remand than existed at the original
hearing. See generally text accompanying note 16 supra. There are cases, of course, in which the
attorney handling the appeal in the federal court will represent the claimant at the hearing on
remand, and courts have expressed hope or simply assumed that this will happen. See, eg.,
Storck v. Weinberger, 402 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D. Md. 1975).
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system because other options, including a fully adversary system, are
thought to offer little or no improvement. 7 9 There is no affirmative
support for the present structure as a particularly suitable system, at
least to the extent that the system is taken as it operates in practice.180
Indeed, studies of the current system indicate that administrative law
judges spend relatively little time on case development and generally
fail to make the most of their abilities or the procedures available to
them.t
There are, however, possibilities for change within the existing non-
adversary structure of the disability determination process that can not
only improve the quality of the process, but also can eliminate virtually
all of the present deficiencies at least with respect to the hearing stage
of the process. The proposal presented below is based on distinctions
drawn in the preceding section between neutral and advocacy func-
tions, and the development and presentation aspects of the hearing pro-
cess. The proposal draws from some recent suggestions for change in
the disability determination process and the recent proposed experi-
ment with the use of government representatives, both of which are
discussed briefly first.
179. See SOCIAL SECURITY HEARING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 46-51 (possibility of represen-
tation for claimants or government does not provide sufficient improvements to justify change
from existing process). See also Mashaw, supra note 13, at 788, in which Professor Mashaw notes
that the concern expressed by the Supreme Court in Perales v. Richardson, 402 U.S. 389, 410
(1971), with "bringing down" the existing structure is understandable because "It]he only logical
replacement for one man wearing three hats is three men, each wearing one . The cost of
such a change, he concludes, would "render it unacceptable." Id. at 789.
180. Judge Friendly advocates extension of the non-adversary model, but expects that "the
'judge' would assume a much more active role with respect to the course of the hearing; for exam-
ple, he would examine the parties, might call his own experts if needed, request that certain types
of evidence be presented, and, if necessary, aid the parties in acquiring that evidence." Friendly,
supra note 15, at 1289. See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 254 (supports broader use of
"inquisitorial" procedure used in Social Security hearings, which includes "active development of
the case on both sides by an independent judge"). Professor Schwartz relies in part on his knowl-
edge of the French inquisitorial system, which includes a very active development role for the
decisionmaker. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-
LAW WORLD (1954). See also Skoler, International Adjudication Perspectives: 4 Comparison of
U.S. Social Security Appeals Procedures With Those of Three Other Nations, 4 OHA L. REP. 43
(No. 3, 1980).
181. ,See SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 3, at 34 (less than 10% spend more than 50% of
their time and more than 50% spend less than 25% of their time on case development; 47% of the
judges indicated that their staff spends 50% or more of their time on development); J. MASHAw, et
al., supra note 3, at 73 ("ALJs do not question claimants very closely in the general run of cases");
id. at 82-87 (vocational experts poorly questioned); id. at 62-63 (ALJs make little use of prehear-
ing conferences to limit and frame issues for hearing).
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A. Some Recent Suggestions For Change
Most suggestions for change in the Social Security disability determi-
nation process have amounted to specific, limited recommendations
designed to improve the present non-adversary system.' 8 2 The recom-
mendations are limited because no clear consensus has emerged to
identify what is wrong with the present system, 8 3 thereby making it
difficult to justify broad proposals for change. Also, there are enough
particulars in the process that can and should be changed to occupy
those interested in reform. 84
The most recent comprehensive series of proposals for change devel-
oped from a study by The National Center for Administrative Justice
funded by the Social Security Administration and published in 1978.111
Despite concern with an "enormous variance in developing effort"
among administrative law judges, the study declined to propose the use
of independent staff to investigate and present claims. The study con-
cluded that the investigatory responsibility for judges should be re-
tained "with an active role in developing and presenting evidence,"
because "the better decision about whether to gather evidence will be
made by the one who ultimately must decide the case."' 6 The study
also advocated greater use of prehearing conferences "to provide a
more focused statement of the issues and the gaps in the evidentiary
record,"' 187 and further study into the possible use of some type of pre-
hearing investigation of the facts by department officials to develop in-
182. Proposals to substitute a fully adversary system are relatively unimportant. See generally
text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. This does not mean, however, that administrative law
judges would not like to see such a change. See SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 3, at 57
("large number" would prefer adversary proceedings).
183. Administrative law judges have no clear sense of the deficiencies in the disability deter-
mination process, although most feel that some changes in administration of the process would be
helpful. Id. at 57-58.
184. Professor Davis forecast such a role for legal services lawyers when he noted in 1965 that
"the choice will often be between employing government-paid lawyers to represent the poor and
discovering or inventing ways to induce the government officers with whom such lawyers would
deal to bring more diligence to the protection of the interests of the poor." K. DAVIS, supra note
85, at § 8.10.
185. J. MASHAW, el al, supra note 3. See also SOCIAL SECURITY HEARING SYSTEM, supra
note 9.
186. J. MASuAw, et al, supra note 3, at 53.
187. Id. at 64. The study also suggests a greater use of prehearing conferences to explore the
possibility of a summary reversal, which "might provide a critical safety valve in the current era of
increasing numbers of appeals." Id.
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formation that might support or refute the claimant's case.' 8 8 The
study also proposed a greater use of written interrogatories concerning
expert medical opinion, whether from neutral medical advisors or from
the claimant's treating physician,8 9 and the exchange of responses be-
tween treating physicians and consultants when the responses appear to
conflict.' 90 Finally, although some suggestions were made to improve
the quality of representation when claimants are represented, the ques-
tion of whether publicly funded representation should be provided was
deferred.' 9 '
The use of a personal interview before the hearing has been sug-
gested by others as a means to develop a better record for the hearing,
or to avoid the need for a hearing altogether.' z9 A related suggestion is
to rely entirely on a face-to-face reconsideration attended by a deci-
sionmaker, a less formal version of the present hearing, or to combine
the reconsideration and hearing stages into a new, more active inquisi-
188. Id. at 62-63. The investigation would include interviewing witnesses, including physi-
cians, and might involve surveillance of the claimant to verify testimony concerning daily activi-
ties. Id. at 61. The authors note that the use of such evidence at a hearing may create a greater
need for claimants to be represented. d. at 62.
189. Id. at 57, 87-89.
190. Id. at 57-59. The authors also suggested that claimants be given a consulting physician's
report prior to the hearing to give them an opportunity to prepare an explanation or rebuttal. Id.
at 59.
191. Id. at 96-97. Suggested improvements included monitoring fees, providing full advice to
claimants concerning representation, and training and certifying attorneys and lay representatives.
1d. at 97. The authors note that posthearing development of evidenceshould be avoided, and that
even with an opportunity to respond this is an area in which claimants are "particularly illsuited"
to represent themselves. Id. at 89.
192. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 33-34; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECUR-
nry, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., IST SESs., BACKGROUND MATERIALS
ON SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 10-11 (Comm. Print 1975). Members of the
Carter administration expressed an interest recently in providing face-to-face meetings with claim-
ants at the reconsideration stage prior to hearing. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 61
(testimony of Secretary of HEW); Social Security Act Disability Program Amendments: Hearings
on i. 3236 and H. 3464 before the Senate Comm on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Hearing]. A group of legal services lawyers testified in support of
the proposal, and recommended that claimants should be represented at the reconsideration con-
ference. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 118-19 ("Claims and evidence will be more
fully developed earlier, and claimants and decision-makers can discuss new evidence and resolve
confusing and ambiguous aspects of the claim"). Cf. id. at 182-83 (statement of Council of State
Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation questioning whether early face-to-face conferences
would improve the determination process). See also id. at 246 (testimony of Commissioner of
Social Security: "Let's get a lot of these cases better decided administratively and out of the
hearing process").
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torial proceeding,193 which may be nothing more than a description of
how the present non-adversary system should operate.' 94 As was the
case with the study by The National Center for Administrative Justice,
an acceptance of the basic non-adversary structure by most commenta-
tors has led to extreme caution in recommending significant changes
concerning representation at disability hearings.'
95
2. Government Representative Experiment
The most important recent consideration of the question of represen-
tation at non-adversary hearings, although short-lived, was the Social
Security Administration's proposed experiment with the use of govern-
ment representatives at Social Security disability hearings. The experi-
ment, which was proposed in January, 1980, and withdrawn before
going into effect in July, 1980,196 would have added a government rep-
resentative to the process to prepare the case for hearing and, if the
claimant was represented, to represent the government at the hear-
ing.197 An experiment using "presenters" also was considered but
never proposed, in which the presenter would have prepared and
presented the case in a neutral and non-adversary capacity whether or
not the claimant was represented.'98
Under the proposed experiment, the preparation function of the rep-
resentative included examination of the evidentiary record for com-
pleteness and obtaining additional necessary evidence, apparently
193. See Dixon, supra note 10, at 738.
194. See note 180 supra.
195. Even Professor Popkin does not advocate representation after concluding that repre-
sented claimants are more successful; instead, he lists policy considerations relevant to deciding
whether representation should be provided that balance some advantages against returns and
costs in the non-adversary setting. Popkin, supra note 1, at 1035. On the other hand, to the extent
that models may be considered that would rely on truly independent, non-active administrative
law judges, the view concerning representation can be expected to change. See, e.g., R. DiXON,
supra note 3, at 147. See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 254 (non-adversary system may be
more "fair" to unrepresented claimants than adversary procedure); Kaufman, supra note 83, at
116 (suggests use of "para-counser').
196. 45 Fed. Reg. 2345, 47162 (1980). The experiment was to involve a randomly selected
number of disability cases at four hearing offices across the country. Id. at 2345.
197. Id. at 2345-46. Parallel regulations were proposed for OASDI and SSI appeals. Page
citations that follow are only to the OASDI regulations.
198. Letter from Director of Office of Policy and Procedures, Social Security Administration
to Frank S. Bloch (July 30, 1980). The presenter's prehearing responsibilities would have been the
same whether the claimant was represented or not; at the hearing, the presenter would have sup-
plemented the representative's questions unless the representative agreed to allow the presenter to
conduct the initial questioning. Id.
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whether such evidence would support the claimant's or the govern-
ment's case.' 99 The proposal intended to insure that evidence was cur-
rent and that "any material conflicts, inconsistencies, ambiguities, or
unclearness in the evidence have been resolved." 2" Furthermore, the
representative would either recommend a favorable decision to the ad-
ministrative law judge if the claimant was entitled to benefits, or rec-
ommend, in appropriate cases, that the appeal be dismissed.01 The
representative would have prepared the case for hearing, however, only
until it was determined that the claimant would not be represented by
an attorney. The representative was to transfer the claim to the hearing
office "promptly" on determining that the claimant would be repre-
sented, and then would "have no further involvement in the case."202
In those cases in which the claimant was represented by an attorney,
the government representative would have presented the government's
case at the hearing. The representative would have been expected to
confer with the claimant's attorney on evidentiary and legal matters
before the hearing and submit, if possible, stipulated facts or issues to
the administrative law judge for approval; meet the government wit-
nesses, request subpoenas and, when necessary, submit additional is-
sues for consideration at the hearing; present an opening statement at
the hearing, offer exhibits and object, when appropriate, to the claim-
ant's exhibits; and present a closing argument and prepare proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.20 3 Even though the representa-
199. The proposed regulations were not explicit on this point, but indicated that the represen-
tative was to "determin[e] the need for additional evidence" and obtain such evidence when "nec-
essary," without limiting this function to supporting the government's case. 45 Fed. Reg. 2347
(1980). This appears to have been the intention of the Social Security Administration, as shown in
draft procedures prepared for the experiment. See Office of Operational Policy and Procedures,
Social Security Administration, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Draft Claims
Manual Proceduresfor Government Representative Experiment 8 (October 5, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Draft Procedures] ("The [government representative] should insure that all sources of
pertinent evidence have been contacted and the evidence obtained, that complete information has
been obtained ... concerning the claimant's condition and its effect on his/her ability to engage
in substantial gainful activity").
200. See Draft Procedures, supra note 199, at 9.
201. 45 Fed. Reg. at 2347. A dismissal recommendation could be based on the grounds of res
judicata or a failure to file a timely appeal. Id.
202. Id. Apparently the determination could have been made at any time during preparation
of the case. At one point the intention was to determine whether a claimant was represented only
after preparation of the case had been completed. Draft Procedures, supra note 199, at 22.
203. 45 Fed. Reg. at 2347. Again, the role of the representative relative to presenting evidence
or arguments favorable to the claimant was unclear in the proposed regulations. Cf. Draft Proce-
dures, supra note 199, at 25 (procedures would have stated explicitly that representative would
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tive would have performed many functions otherwise left to the admin-
istrative law judge, the judge would have retained ultimate
responsibility for the full and complete development and presentation
of the case. 2°
The experiment was proposed as one of a number of changes in the
disability determination process designed "to provide better decisions
earlier in the process, to sharpen the issues presented to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and to streamline the process. 2 5 More specifically,
the introduction of a government representative was designed to im-
prove the quality of hearing decisions, enhance the uniformity and con-
sistency of decisions, accelerate the process, increase administrative law
judge productivity, and reduce hearing costs.2°6 Central to all of these
purposes was the idea that by developing the record and presenting the
case when the claimant was represented, a government representative
would free the administrative law judge from time consuming and di-
verting responsibilities relative to the development and presentation of
the case in order to serve in a more traditional judicial role.207
The proposed experiment was withdrawn following generally nega-
tive comments in favor of considering broader reforms that would in-
retain "the traditional responsibility [of a Social Security Administration] employee to ensure that
the claimant's interests are represented, and that any facts favorable to the claimant are brought
out at the hearing").
204. 45 Fed. Reg. at 2347.
205. Id. at 2345. One change in the prehearing process is included in the 1980 amendments:
notices of disability decisions must now "contain a statement of the case, in understandable lan-
guage, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Secretary's determination and the
reason or reasons upon which it is based." 1980 Amendments, supra note 2, § 305, at 457. Such
detailed and individualized notices of decision are expected to improve disability decisions by
requiring a formulation of reasons, and to make it less likely that claimants will appeal decisions
because they will understand why their claim was denied. See 1979 House Report, supra note
107, at 12; 1979 Senate Report, supra note 107, at 56-57. See also J. MASHAW, et at, supra note 3,
at 60-61. Another suggestion, not implemented in the 1980 amendments, was to improve the
initial determination process by including a face-to-face conference with a decisionmaker. See
note 192 supra.
206. 45 Fed. Reg. at 2347.
207. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 238 (testimony of Commissioner of Social
Security that the use of a government representative, and improved initial determination proce-
dures, would "insure a better developed case and permit the administrative law judge to serve in a
more purely judicial role"); id. at 50 (Statement of Secretary of HEW that the use of government
representatives "will help protect the Government's interests and permit the ALJ to serve in a
more purely judicial role"); Memorandum from Commissioner of Social Security to Secretary of
HEW 4 (November 23, 1979) (government representative will allow the administrative law judge
"to give more time and attention to the primary tasks of conducting the hearing and issuing a
proper decision").
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clude initial determinations and reconsiderations." 8 A wide range of
objections were raised, among them concern that the government rep-
resentative would disadvantage represented and unrepresented claim-
ants, that the advantages of a non-adversary setting would be lost, and
that the process would become less efficient and more costly.20 9 Many
legal services programs filed objections to the proposed experiment em-
phasizing their concern that the use of a government representative
would introduce an adversary relationship between claimants and the
government. They feared that an adversary relationship would result
in an anti-claimant attitude on the part of the representatives and
therefore records would be developed to favor the government's, rather
than the claimant's, position.210
C. Non-Adversary Representatives A New Approach to the Problems
of Non-Representation
The Social Security Administration's decision to reconsider the gov-
208. 45 Fed. Reg. at 47162. The administration indicated that among the changes it would
consider would be "a personal conference before the hearing stage, as well as more complete
documentation of claims and more accurate and well-reasoned decisions earlier in the process."
Id.
209. Among the comments submitted to the Social Security Administration in response to the
publication of the proposed experiment were: Letters from the National Employment Director,
Disabled American Veterans to Commissioner of Social Security (February 6, 1980) (would ne-
gate fair and impartial hearing process, discriminate against claimants with attorneys, burden
administrative process, and increase costs); Administrative Law Center of the Legal Aid Bureau,
Inc., Baltimore, Maryland to Commissioner of Social Security (February 28, 1980) (adversary
hearing would create unfairness in process to disadvantage of claimants, reforms at initial deter-
mination and reconsideration stages would be more efficient and less costly); Lawndale Legal
Services, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago to Commissioner of Social Security (March 5,
1980) (government representative would delay and complicate the process, procedural tools avail-
able to government representative would be used to disadvantage of claimants); National Senior
Citizens Law Center to Commissioner of Social Security (March 10, 1980) (government represen-
tative would control development of record to disadvantage of claimants and restrict access to
record by claimants and administrative law judges, poor development can be corrected more eas-
ily and at less cost earlier in the process).
210. See, e.g., Letter from Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, supra note 209, at 9
(claimants would have to "deal with a panoply of adversarial technicalities not only in the presen-
tation of evidence but even, potentially, in its collection and utilization"); Letter from National
Senior Citizens Law Center, supra note 209, at 4 ("The representative will be adversarial not just
at the hearing but in deciding what evidence to seek"; "even if [evidence favorable to the claimant
is] sought, given the adversarial nature, it is possible that such evidence will be hidden or dis-
carded rather than presented at the hearing"). The Administration did not expect the experiment
to be perceived as so "anti-claimant." See Memorandum from Commissioner of Social Security
to Secretary of HEW 2 (April 14, 1980).
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emnment representative experiment in light of possible improvements in
the earlier stages of the disability determination process is sound, at
least to the extent that government representatives would have been
used to compile the basic evidentiary record for the appeal. There is no
reason why clearly underdeveloped records cannot be identified and
supplemented by existing personnel to include complete and legible
medical reports from the claimant's treating physicians and hospital
records which cover all recent or otherwise relevant hospital visits. In-
deed, without some significant improvements in the early stages of the
process the use of representatives on behalf of claimants or the govern-
ment would possibly serve as a disincentive to full, prehearing develop-
ment of the record.21' An improvement as slight as this would
eliminate one of the development responsibilities left to administrative
law judges but not always met: The compilation of essentially neutral
documentary evidence. Thus, cases would not have to be remanded
because records were illegible, or because reports from treating physi-
cians or reports of hospital visits were missing."' Administrative law
judges should be relieved of the "non-judicial" development function
and representatives need not be provided to perform neutral tasks.
Furthermore, if the administration proceeds with the suggestion that
a face-to-face conference should be included at the initial determina-
tion or reconsideration stage, certain basic testimony from claimants
and other witnesses could be presented at that time. Under the present
system such basic testimony should be, although often it is not, elicited
from claimants by the administrative law judge. In addition, a com-
plete list of known and available witnesses could be developed for use
at a subsequent hearing. Thus, more effective use of prehearing proce-
211. One of the criticisms of the present system is the minimal incentive for full development
of the record at early stages in the process because additional evidence can be compiled once a
hearing is requested. See DISABILrrY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE, supra note 2, at 2. See also
note 69 and text accompanying notes 104-10 supra. On the other hand, the Commissioner of
Social Security expressed the view recently that the use of government representatives would en-
courage better decisions at earlier stages in the process because the people making the decision
would know that their decision would be defended at a subsequent hearing. 1979 Senate Report,
supra note 107, at 68.
212. See cases discussed at text accompanying notes 136-43 supra. The uselessness of some
remands in these circumstances is illustrated in Machen v. Gardner, 319 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968), in which the court remanded because medical reports were illegible. The following
year the same court affirmed the denial of the same claimant's benefits, noting that the "infirmity
in the record has been corrected" by oral testimony of the doctor. Machen v. Finch, 319 F. Supp.
1245, 1246 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
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dures would avoid the need for administrative law judges to perform
their other major development function, the compilation of a list of
witnesses, and certain of their presentation functions relative to the
questioning of claimants and other witnesses. Additionally, many
court-ordered remands based on failures to corroborate other evidence
or testimony in the record or to meet responsibilities such as calling key
witnesses, questioning claimants fully concerning known disabilities
and previous work experience, and questioning other witnesses on sim-
ilar matters could be avoided.2"3 Again, these essentially neutral pres-
entation tasks can be performed without the assistance of
representatives.21 4
The decision not to experiment with the use of representatives should
not be permanent, however, whether or not the prehearing stages of the
process are reformed. The introduction of a representative into the
hearing process similar to the proposed government representative
model, or perhaps more like the neutral and non-adversary
"presenters" excluded from the experiment, will be necessary to
achieve the goal of providing disability decisions based on complete
records and following full and fair hearings. The problem with the
proposed government representative model is that the approach was to
move toward adversary representation. 1 5 The presence of an adver-
sary element in the model, however, detracted unnecessarily from the
positive aspects of the present non-adversary system.21 6 The use of a
single non-adversary representative at the hearing stage would assure
that disability decisions are based on complete records and follow full
and fair hearings. This result can be facilitated by having the represen-
tative perform those advocacy functions that administrative law judges
have not performed, and really should not perform, without destroying
213. See cases discussed at text accompanying notes 149-50, 163-70 supra.
214. But see 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 248-49, in which the Commissioner of
Social Security indicated that the administration might want to provide representation for claim-
ants at a face-to-face reconsideration conference.
215. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 50. (Secretary of HEW characterizing experi-
ment as a "move to a more traditional adversary system"). Many legal services programs took this
view of the experiment. See text accompanying note 210 .rupra.
216. The degree to which the government representative was intended to advocate the govern-
ment's position is unclear. See text accompanying notes 199-204supra. Also, the more adversary
the government representative becomes, the greater the need for claimant representation. See
1979 House Hearings, supra 9, at 259 (testimony of President, Association of Administrative Law
Judges, supporting use of government representatives, but noting that it "creates the counter-
vailing necessity of claimant representation").
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the non-adversary structure of the process dictated by the nature and
purposes of the Social Security Act. The change would be fully consis-
tent with other improvements in the earlier stages of the disability de-
termination process. Moreover, without other improvements, the
prehearing records will remain so incomplete that even essentially neu-
tral developments tasks must be performed by someone at the hearing
stage. If necessary, non-adversary representatives could assume these
responsibilities that have not been fulfilled satisfactorily by the admin-
istrative law judges. Even if prehearing administrators developed a ba-
sic record and list of witnesses, representatives in many cases would
have to supplement the record to support all theories and issues that
should be presented.2"7
Without attempting to present a detailed profile of non-adversary
representatives, certain essential attributes can be identified. First, they
would be professional representatives, not necessarily lawyers,218
trained to develop and present all evidence necessary to establish the
ultimate issue of whether the claimant is capable of engaging in sub-
stantial gainful activity. Second, they would be independent from the
Office of Hearings and Appeals and even from the Social Security Ad-
ministration, hired perhaps through a new office of the Department of
Health and Human Services. Thus the representatives would not be
unlike the "independent corps of developers-presenters" rejected by the
study by The National Center for Administrative Justice.21 9 The au-
thors of the study concluded that a change to independent developers-
presenters would offer "no obvious accuracy advantages over the pres-
217. Thus, the study by The National Center for Administrative Justice concludes that "[i]f
there is a respect in which a more adversary perspective may be required, it is in the prehearing
development of the facts, not the questioning of witnesses at the hearing." J. MAsHAw, et a.,
supra note 3, at 98. In any event, there is no reason to require administrative law judges to
compile such documents. To a limited extent, staff assistants are supposed to do this work, but in
fact are often not available or not used for these purposes. See STAFF REPORT, srupra note 9, at
43-44; SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 3, at 34-36.
218. Although Professor Popkin finds that attorney representatives are more likely to present
new evidence than nonattorney representatives, Popkin, supra note 1, at 1030, it is far from clear
that formal legal training is necessary to be an effective representative at a disability hearing. See,
e.g., Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1179, 1180 (6th Cir. 1970) (McCree, J., dissenting); J. MAsHAw, el
aZ, supra note 3, at 96. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(need "competent and independent" assistance at commitment hearings from prison to mental
health facility, but not necessarily licensed attorneys). The government representative experiment
would have used both attorneys and nonattorneys. 45 Fed. Reg. 2345 (1980).
219. See SociAL SEcuRrrY HEARING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 48; J. MAsHAw, et a., supra
note 3, at 53.
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ent system,' '220 and might possibly be counterproductive because ad-
ministrative law judges, given their expertise and the fact that they will
decide the case, may be in the best position to determine what evidence
should be presented. 2 ' The remand cases show, however, that admin-
istrative law judges often are unable or unwilling to assume the role
necessary to justify this confidence in the present system.222 When the
judges' failure to develop a record or present a case adequately stems
from an inability or unwillingness to perform tasks with an advocacy
dimension, the need for independent developers-presenters or non-ad-
versary representatives at the hearing stage becomes apparent.223
The third attribute of non-adversary representatives is that they
would be active developers and presenters of the case from a non-ad-
versary perspective. Social Security disability hearings involve more
than the evaluation of objective and easily obtained medical reports
and records, despite the Supreme Court's view that disability decisions
are based primarily on "routine, standard and unbiased medical re-
ports by physician specialists. 224 Moreover, because the hearing is the
only time when claimants and their witnesses meet face-to-face with a
decisionmaker, fully presented oral testimony is extremely impor-
tant.225 It is with regard to these development and presentation func-
tions, that is, those that involve more than the development of known
doctors reports and hospital records and the presentation of routine
questions of claimants and obvious witnesses, that some form of advo-
cacy is needed to assure the development of a complete record and a
220. See SOCIAL SECURITY HEARING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 48.
221. J. MASHAW, et al, supra note 3, at 53.
222. See text accompanying notes 130-70, supra.
223. The authors of the study recognize that "critical, circumstantial evidence. . . is routinely
absent in disability cases," J. MASHAW, et al, supra note 3, at 53, but suggest that more active
prehearing investigation could alleviate this problem. See text accompanying notes 186-90 supra.
224. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 404 (1971)). The difficulties administrative law judges have in assuring full and fair hearing
belies this contention. See also Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Adminis-
trative 4djudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REv. 28, 41-42 (1976).
225. An administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration wrote, "[o]ral exam-
ination is the core of the hearing process. Without it, there would be little reason to hold a hear-
ing. Oral testimony is a more satisfactory and preferable means of obtaining specific data than
written statement." Hayes, Social Security Disability and the Administrative Law Judge, 17 A.F.L.
REV. 73,77 (1975). See also SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 3, at 46 (92% of administrative
law judges responding to survey agreed that "the ability to assess the claimant's allegation of pain
and general credibility on a face-to-face basis [is] very important").
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full presentation of the claim.22 6 And yet, given the beneficent and re-
medial purposes of the Social Security Act, the advocacy need not be
adversarial in a traditional sense. Although the representative must be
willing and able to seek out evidence and argue positions that would be
expected of advocates for claimants or the government, a non-adver-
sary representative would perform with the specific goal of presenting
all relevant evidence and arguments to assist the administrative law
judge in reaching the correct decision as to whether the claimant is eli-
gible for disability benefits.
The basic responsibilities of non-adversary representatives would be
something like the following: obtain detailed personal letters from
treating physicians covering all relevant information concerning known
disabilities; explore other possible bases of disability by talking with
the claimant and examining the existing record, and obtain necessary
medical evidence to support or refute the claim; interview and call all
relevant witnesses suggested by the record and an interview with the
claimant, including, when necessary, medical and vocational experts;
question the claimant and all witnesses fully concerning all possible
bases of disability and on all other relevant matters, whether or not the
resulting testimony is favorable to the claimant's case; present all po-
tentially relevant hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, if
any, and question the expert as to the basis of any opinions offered; and
assure, in general, that all relevant evidence and arguments have been
presented to the administrative law judge. Consequently, claims would
be developed and presented fully and few if any cases would be re-
manded because of an incomplete record or the lack of a full and fair
hearing.227 Moreover, a non-adversary representative could perform
these advocacy tasks, given the underlying non-adversary nature of the
226. In disagreeing with the Supreme Court's characterization of Social Security disability
hearings, see text accompanying note 224, supra, Professor Mashaw observes that, "a procedure
that begins with routine medical reports concerning clinical diagnosis and treatment becomes a
highly judgmental process," requiring the determination of physical abnormalities, resulting func-
tional limitations, the degree to which any physical and functional limitations affect normal ca-
pacities, and the interaction of any such limitation with the claimant's ability to work at a job in
the national economy, among other matters. Mashaw, supra note 223, at 41-42.
227. Although most of the remand cases involve circumstances which indicate that the repre-
sentatives would be concentrating on the claimant's case, in many instances the representatives
also would be developing or presenting the government's case. The government's case is involved,
for example, in most remands required by poor questioning of vocational experts. See also Foster
v. Mathews, 423 F. Supp. 117, 121 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (remand when Secretary failed to offer evi-
dence rebutting presumption of eligibility established by earlier determination of disability).
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overall process, as well as, if not better than, claimant and government
representatives.228
In some other respects the representatives' role would be more diffi-
cult. Although disability cases cannot be settled in the usual sense, a
representative may be able to present information to one side or the
other which would show that the appeal was not necessary. It would be
inappropriate, however, for the representative to attempt to resolve the
dispute independently and actually recommend reversal or dismis-
sal.229 Similarly, representatives should refrain from presenting a clos-
ing argument and instead should present a comprehensive statement of
the issues and possible resolutions of the areas of conflict. 230 After the
hearing is completed, the representative could evaluate the record and
recommend whether the losing party should appeal.
Non-adversary representatives would do more than relieve adminis-
trative law judges of time consuming and diverting responsibilities.
Separating the judges from the actual development of the record and
presentation of the cases would put them in what the proponents of the
government representative experiment called the "traditional judicial
role,"23" thereby assuring greater impartiality and higher quality deci-
sions.232 The more active or adversary the administrative law judge
228. Thus, Judge Frankel questions the traditional adversary system in terms of development
of evidence. See Frankel, supra note 73, at 1038 ("we leave most of the investigatory work to paid
partisans, which is scarcely a guarantee of thorough and detached exploration"). The non-adver-
sary advocates would be or become expert in this area, unlike many claimant representatives.
229. See generally, Mashaw, supra note 13, at 776-804 (full adversary structure less valuable
when it cannot achieve compromise solutions).
230. Thus, the presenter model considered by the Administration would have excluded final
argument from the presenter's responsibilities, while the government representative would have
argued the government's case. See 45 Fed. Reg. 2345, 2347 (1980); note 198 supra; Letter to Frank
S. Bloch, supra note 198.
231. See text accompanying note 207 supra.
232. Problems concerning the maintenance of impartiality by administrative law judges are
discussed at text accompanying notes 120-21 supra. See also B. SCHWARZ, supra note 12, at 254
("It is [the administrative law judge] who questions or, when the claimant has an attorney, cross-
examines the claimant. No matter how friendly and informal the administrative law judge may
try to be, the potential conflict of interest between the claimant and the agency cannot be dis-
guised"). Noting the trend of greater claimant representation, the Commissioner of Social Secur-
ity recently expressed the opinion that administrative law judges "would prefer, as anyone who
has studied legal process would, to have both sides presented and to make a decision. I think you
are in a much better position to make fair decisions if you hear the arguments on both sides.
Nobody likes to wear more than one hat." 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 244-45. Greater
separation of administrative law judges from an active role in developing the record and present-
ing the case may alleviate another basis for "at least the appearance of bias in favor of the
agency," that is, the fact that they are assigned specifically to the Social Security Administration
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must become to meet the development or presentation responsibilities
of the office, the greater the damage to the judge's traditional judicial
role. Whether the administrative law judge is placed in the position of
developing or refuting the claimant's case, the judges' attempts to meet
these responsibilities can harm the process just as their failure to fulfill
their duties undermines the process.2 3 3 The dilemma is noted most
often in attempts by administrative law judges to cross-examine a
claimant or a witness, or to counter a claimant's argument. These at-
tempts are perceived as evidence of a lack of impartiality and can lead
to a remand of the case by the courts.234
and that "[flact-finders with great expertise in a particular area may have such strong preconcep-
tions about certain problems that they will not be able to evaluate evidence or arguments before
them fairly or accurately." Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing
and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389, 402. See also Thibaut,
Walker & Lind, 4dversary Presentation and Bias in Legal.Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REV. 386,
397 (1972) (when decisionmaker has an expectation about the final result in a case, adversary, as
opposed to inquisitorial, method of presenting evidence more likely to counteract bias).
233. The Commissioner of Social Security addressed the problem of administrative law judges
being "placed in the position of both developing a case for the claimant and serving as the judge
in the case" in recent testimony, and concluded that "[t]he administrative law judge faced with a
poorly developed case cannot entirely act as a true judge. This situation should be changed."
1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 238. A statement filed at the same hearings on behalf of the
Association of Staff Attorneys of the Office of Hearings and Appeals noted that "clever attorneys"
representing claimants can present a very strong case and that the administrative law judge, "if he
wants to become the claimant's adversary and investigate the case,. . . can possibly offset some of
the evidence, where he suspects that the evidence is being manipulated. But he is not supposed to
become the claimant's adversary. He is supposed to be neutral." Id. at 383.
234. In some instances, the questioning shows that the administrative law judge was biased.
See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra. Cf. Prewitt v. Celebrezze, 330 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir.
1964) (finding medical records incomplete, court concluded "[w]e think the examiner was fair but
he was in the position of being both judge and advocate").
The Commissioner of Social Security referred to the problem of an appearance of bias and
court remands in recent testimony. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 247 ("sharp ques-
tions [by the administrative law judge] may produce a record which subsequently gives the court
the feeling that the claimant hasn't been accorded a fair hearing, because the administrative law
judge has had to do the work that ought to be done by the representatives of the parties"); 1979
Senate Hearings, supra note 192, at 68 ("one of the reasons we have so many court cases is that if
the [administrative law judge] is too aggressive in questioning the witness, it may set up for a court
reversal"). Cf. J. MAsHAW, et al, supra note 3, at 98 ("Although the AJ, in order to retain the
appearance of objectivity, cannot utilize some of the aggressive techniques commonly thought
(often mistakenly) to comprise effective cross-examination, we see no reason why his questioning
cannot be as probing as that of any well-constructed cross-examination."). See also 1979 House
Hearings at 379-80 (statement of Association of Staff Attorneys of Office Hearings and Appeals,
that administrative law judges must cross-examine carefully to avoid being reversed by the district
courts although "[a] government attorney would not be so restricted"); McCray v. Califano, 438 F.
Supp. 128, 131 (M.D. La. 1980) ("There is a real danger that if the [administrative law judge]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/1
NON-ADVERSARY HEARINGS
Although the use of non-adversary representatives can cure at least
one basic flaw of the present non-adversary system-the overextension
of administrative law judge responsibilities-it does not follow that
there is no place in the process for representatives who would advocate
on behalf of a claimant or the government. Certainly claimants would
remain entitled to bring their own representatives, but presumably the
perceived need for or advantage to be gained from representation
would be reduced greatly in most cases. If there are cases that the non-
adversary representative cannot develop or present properly, for exam-
ple, if the medical or vocational issues are particularly complex or sub-
jective, then the administrative law judge may wish to suggest separate
representation for the claimant, or perhaps for both the claimant and
the government. 235 Moreover, the use of non-adversary representatives
would not require elimination of the administrative law judge's ulti-
mate responsibility for the development of a complete record and the
presentation of a full and fair hearing. 36
III. CONCLUSION
A purely non-adversary system that relies on the administrative law
judge alone to assure that decisions are based on a complete record and
following a full and fair hearing does not work for many unrepresented
Social Security disability claimants, or, in some instances, for an unrep-
resented Social Security Administration. Courts try to deal with this
fact by monitoring administrative law judge performance relative to
the development and presentation of the claim. Consequently, courts
remand many cases for further proceedings. This is, at best, a costly
and ineffective way to deal with those particular cases and is no solu-
tion for all the hearing decisions that are based on inadequate records
and are not appealed. Administrative law judges simply cannot and
states in the hearing agruments against the applicant's claim, the applicant will conclude that he is
taking part against her and that she is being treated unfairly.").
235. See generally J. MASIAW, et al., supra note 3, at 95-97; Popkin, supra note 1, at 1035-48;
Yourman, supra note 19, at 1235-38.
236. The government representative experiment did not contemplate any change in the ad-
ministrative law judge's ultimate responsibilities. See 45 Fed. Reg. 2345, 2347 (1980). See also
Memorandum from the Commissioner of Social Security to Secretary of HEW 4 (November 23,
1979) (because under the experiment administrative law judges "should be able to devote more
time and attention to determining the facts and making a decision. . ., [their] role as a judge and
as the person responsible for the conduct of the hearing would not be diminished; in fact, this role
should be increased").
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should not do all that is expected of them; that is, assist the claimant
and at the same time "be very careful to ask the sort of questions that
an attorney might ask on cross-examination, 2 37 because they cannot
"be an equivalent substitute for a lawyer devoted exclusively to a
party's interests. '2 38 The introduction of non-adversary representatives
into the disability determination process, hopefully together with other
improvements in the initial and reconsideration levels, but perhaps
more importantly if no other improvements are made, will achieve the
shared goals of claimants and the public often foresaken under the
present system when claimants are unrepresented: the goal that the
truly disabled receive the benefits to which they are entitled. A recog-
nition of the need for advocacy and representation at non-adversary
hearings is a necessary element in the search for the proper structure
for non-adversary proceedings and the inquiry into further uses for
non-adversary processes in the context of other types of dispute resolu-
tions.
237. J. MASHAW, et al., supra note 3, at 86.
238. Guzman v. Califano, 480 F. Supp. 735, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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